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ABSTRACT 
 
Kyrgyzstan’s power sector currently faces significant problems posing serious 
threat not only to its future development outlook, but even to the short term 
energetic security of the country. Probably the most important of the problems is 
consistently poor operational and financial performance of the power sector 
enterprises. 
This research was conducted with the aim of acquiring deep 
understanding of the operations of the Kyrgyzstani power sector and problems, 
causing the inefficiency of state-owned power sector enterprises. The research 
further sought to identify the types of rents and rent-seeking activities present in 
the sector, the role of major stakeholders of the power sector in the creation and 
distribution of those rents. Using a rent-seeking theory based analytical 
framework, the author tested the hypothesis that corruption and other rent-
seeking activities negatively affect efficiency and profitability the power sector 
companies. Privatization of the power distribution companies has long been on 
the agenda of the Kyrgyzstani policymakers as a possibly effective mechanism for 
addressing the problems of inefficiency and raising investment capital to finance 
the reconstruction and development of the power distribution network. The second 
research question sought to clarify the reasons why privatization would have 
positive impact on performance of the power distribution companies. The analysis 
needed to answer this question considers the implications that privatization might 
have on the rents and rent-seeking activities already defined earlier in the text.  
vi 
 
This study was conducted using Qualitative Case Study approach, was 
based on secondary data from journals, books, reports by the World Bank, the 
IMF, the UNDP, non-governmental expert organizations, legal acts of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, data on the power sector enterprises’ performance provided by the 
Ministry of Energy and Industry of the Kyrgyz Republic and the author’s own 
observations resulting from his working experience as a Kyrgyzstani policy 
maker. 
The first main finding of the study is that corruption and other rent-seeking 
activities, deeply embedded in the operations of the Kyrgyzstani power sector, 
adversely affect operational and financial efficiency of the power sector. The 
second finding is that privatization is likely to lead to improved efficiency of the 
power sector via curtailing opportunities and weakening incentives for corrupt 
behavior in the sector.     
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SUMMARY 
 
In more than two decades passed after independence from the Soviet Union in 
1991 the Kyrgyz Republic has made a substantial progress on its way to 
transitioning from typical socialistic “planned” economy to “free market”. 
However, despite the overall high level of economic liberalization in the country, 
some sectors of the economy have only partially been affected by liberalization 
reforms. Almost all public utility enterprises in Kyrgyzstan are still under state or 
municipal ownership, which, probably, is one of the reasons for their poor 
financial and operational performance. 
Power distribution sector is not an exception. State-owned enterprises 
operating in the power sector demonstrate consistently lackluster performance. 
This research is aimed at analyzing factors, causing inefficiency of state-owned 
power distribution companies, with particular focus on the impact of rent-seeking 
activities inherent in the operations of the power distribution sector in Kyrgyzstan. 
The first research objective of this thesis is to identify the character of rent-
seeking activities and rents, created and maintained by major groups of the power 
sector stakeholders like politicians, consumers, professionals of the power sector 
and suppliers of fuel and equipment.  
It has been suggested by many policymakers in Kyrgyzstan that the 
privatization of power distribution companies, which currently are the main 
source of the inefficiency in the power sector, is likely to result in improved 
efficiency of the power sector companies. For this reason, the second research 
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objective of this thesis aims to assess possible implications that privatization of 
the power distribution sector might have for efficiency of the power distribution 
companies. In this study the analysis will focus on the role of privatization 
reforms in curtailing opportunities for inefficient rent-seeking and corruption in 
the power sector, which is expected to lead to improved efficiency.  
The research is conducted using qualitative case study method and is based 
upon secondary data from academic journals, books, reports by the World Bank, 
the IMF, the UNDP, non-governmental expert organizations, legal acts of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, data on the power sector enterprises’ performance, provided by 
the Ministry of Energy and Industry of the Kyrgyz Republic, and the author’s own 
observations, resulting from his working experience as a Kyrgyzstani policy 
maker. 
The analysis rests upon a rent-seeking theory based analytical framework, 
which is used to provide definition of rents and rent-seeking activities that are 
present in the operations of the power sector and to provide assessment of the 
impact that these rents and rent-seeking activities have for the performance of the 
power sector SOEs and overall social welfare.  
Privatization of SOEs is frequently presented as a solution to the public 
sector’s inefficiency. This thesis will seek to answer the questions “if” and “why” 
privatization can be effective in becoming a viable solution for addressing the 
power sector’s inefficiency problem. It is done by looking at privatization’s 
impact on the efficiency of Kyrgyzstani power sector through lens of its effect on 
the inefficient rents.   
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The first main finding of the study is that corruption and other rent-seeking 
activities by major interest groups in the power sector, such as politicians, 
consumers, power sector professionals and suppliers of fuel and equipment  have 
adverse impact on operational and financial efficiency of the power distribution 
companies. The second main finding is that privatization of the power distribution 
companies is likely to cause substantial improvement of the power distribution 
companies’ efficiency by weakening influence that politicians have on the power 
sector enterprises, by curtailing opportunities and weakening managers’ incentives 
for engaging in corrupt activities.     
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Chapter 1: Research Background 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Economy of Kyrgyzstan 
 
The Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan) is a low income country with nominal per 
capita GDP equaling 1,124 US dollars and PPP per capita GDP equaling 2,200 
US dollars in 2011 (World Bank). The nominal GDP of Kyrgyzstan in 2011 
equaled 6.2 billion US dollars, while real growth rate of - 6.0 per cent (World 
Bank). The dynamics of real GDP growth is shown on Figure 1 below. Sharp 
decline in the economic growth rate in 2005 and 2010 resulting in some 
contraction of the economy was due to the shock effects of revolutions taking 
place in respective years. 
It is argued that the revolution of the 2010 in Kyrgyzstan was to a large 
Figure 1: Real GDP Growth Rate, 2000 – 2011 (%) 
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degree caused by sharp rise in electricity and heating energy tariffs introduced in 
January 2010 amidst widespread concerns about deeply ingrained corruption in 
the power sector (Slay, 2011). It has to be noted that the tariffs increase was put in 
force after two years of the so called “energy crisis”, caused in part by the natural 
cyclical droughty season and partially by mismanagement in the power industry. 
Severe lack of water resources necessitated resorting to rationing electricity and 
was carried out in the form of scheduled rolling blackouts, which caused 
significant discomfort for businesses and population, especially in rural areas.  
Services sector accounts for the largest share in Kyrgyzstan’s economy 
with almost 52 per cent and largest share of GDP, followed by agriculture – 18 
per cent and industry – 17 per cent.  
The Kyrgyz Republic is open to international trade and was the first 
among CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries to enter World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1998. However, this fact failed to create the desired 
momentum for the development of export oriented sectors of the economy. 
Imports to the Kyrgyz Republic greatly exceed its exports resulting in substantial 
trade balance deficit. In 2011 exports totaled 2.3 billion US dollars while imports 
equaled 3.9 billion US dollars (National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2011). 
Kyrgyzstan’s main export markets are: Russia, Switzerland, Kazakhstan and 
Afghanistan. Main export goods are gold, electricity, cotton, wool, meat, tobacco 
and rare-earth metals. Main categories of import goods brought in from China, 
Russia and Kazakhstan include oil products, machinery and equipment, chemicals 
and food products. 
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Due to Kyrgyzstan’s small size and its openness to international trade, it is 
vulnerable to diverse external shocks like financial instability in the world’s 
leading economies; economic volatility in main trading partner countries: Russia, 
Kazakhstan, China, etc.; and price fluctuations on global commodity goods 
markets (especially food and oil). 
Economic conjunctures in Russia and Kazakhstan are very important for 
Kyrgyzstan also because of the large number of labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan 
currently working there and regularly sending money to their families back home. 
It is estimated that about 800,000 Kyrgyzstani or approximately 15 per cent of the 
country’s population work in Russia and Kazakhstan (Tursunov, 2013). 
Kyrgyzstan, with remittances equaling 29 per cent of GDP in 2011, was the third 
remittance-dependent country of the world after Tajikistan and Liberia (World 
Bank, 2013). According to the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic data the 
amount of remittances to the country in 2011 equaled 1,695 million USD, in 2012 
– 2,018 million USD (National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic). 
Inflation rate in the Kyrgyz Republic is unstable. In 2011 inflation went up 
to 16.6 per cent from 7.8 per cent in 2010 and 6.9 per cent in 2009 (Global 
Finance). The highest inflation rate in Kyrgyzstan in the period from 2000 to 2011 
was observed in 2008 – following world commodity price shock it reached 24.5 
per cent.  
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Significant budget deficit has become a norm in Kyrgyzstan. In the period of 
2000-2010 the budget deficit averaged approximately 80.7 million USD or 3 per 
cent of GDP. In 2011 sharp increase in the budget deficit was registered, reaching 
232.8 million US dollars. Such drastic increase was mostly due to the post-
revolutionary government’s decision to significantly boost spending on social 
sector. In 2011 the budget deficit increased dramatically. Currently for financing 
the budget deficit the government relies not only on internal, but, to a large 
degree, also on external sources of financing. The trend lines for revenues, 
expenditures and deficit of the state budget are reflected on the Figure 2.  
Main source of financing the budget deficit is external borrowing. Two 
decades of following policies of extensively borrowing from external sources such 
as the IMF, the WB and other international financial organizations and foreign 
Source: National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic, Annual Report 2011 
Figure 2: Revenues, Expenditures and Overall Deficit of the State Budget, 2007 - 
2011 (as % of GDP) 
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governments, etc. have created huge public debt, which in 2012 equaled 3.6 
billion US dollars. The trend line of Kyrgyzstan’s growing external debt as a per 
cent of GDP is provided on Figure 3 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.2 Power Sector of the Kyrgyz Republic 
 
Power sector plays important role in the economic and social life of Kyrgyzstan. 
For instance, in 2008 it accounted for 3.9 per cent of GDP, 16 per cent of 
industrial output and 10 per cent of income to the state budget. Currently 98 per 
cent of population has access to electricity supply. In terms of per capita electric 
energy consumption with 1351 kWh per year Kyrgyzstan is falling behind the 
world average 2343 kWh (Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2008). 
Kyrgyzstan’s power sector structurally consists of 7 companies with state 
majority ownership: 1 generation company JSC “Electricheskie Stantsii” (the 
generation company), 1 transmission company JSC “Nacionalnie Electricheskie 
Source: www.indexmundi.com 
Figure 3: External Debt of the Kyrgyz Republic, in billion USD 
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Seti Kyrgyzstana” (the transmission company), 4 regional power distribution 
companies (JSC “Severelectro”, “Vostokelectro”, “Djalalabatelectro”, 
“Oshelectro”) and 1 heating network company. There are several private small 
scale power plants and small electricity resellers, but their share in the overall 
energy production and distribution is insignificant. 
All of the abovementioned 7 SOEs were previously divisions of single 
vertically integrated power monopoly “Kyrgyzenergo”, which in 2001 was split 
into 8 companies as part of the Program of denationalization and privatization of 
the monopolist enterprise. Soon after unbundling one of newly created companies, 
“Chakan GES”, a company comprising of several small hydropower generation 
plants, was sold to private investors. State ownership in all 7 major companies of 
the electric power sector, which all have ‘open type corporation’ status, equals to 
93.7 per cent. Yet, the Act of the Kyrgyz Republic “On special status of the 
cascade of Toktogul hydroelectric power plants and national high-voltage power 
grid” stipulates that generation nor transmission companies’ state-owned stock 
packages can neither be privatized, used as collateral; nor can the companies be 
operated under asset management agreement (Jogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, 2002).  
Kyrgyzstan has significant hydropower potential and to date only 10 per cent 
of it has been realized. Existing capacity of power generation is 3,800 MW 
(megawatt) coming from 16 hydropower plants (3,070 MW) and two thermal 
power plants (730 MW). Average annual volume of electric energy production 
equals 15 billion kWh (kilowatt-hours). About 90 per cent share of the total 
energy production volume is generated by hydropower plants.  
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Development of the power sector in Kyrgyzstan took place during Soviet 
times in the second half of the twentieth century, when massive investments were 
channeled into its technological development and capacity building. According to 
the Soviet Union’s power industry development plan republics of Central Asia 
(Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) became part of the 
interdependent electricity system. Since all republics were part of one country, the 
effort was made to utilize unique characteristics of each country to maximize 
overall benefit. As a result, most thermal power plants were built in carbon fuel 
rich Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In mountainous Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
where most of the region’s hydropower potential is concentrated, the priority was 
reasonably given to the development of hydropower generation. As opposed to 
thermal plants, HPPs provide possibility of quickly changing their current 
generation power. Such features enable HPPs to play the role of the power 
frequency regulators in this system, ensuring stability of the whole energy system 
during surges in demand for electric energy. Due to such technological 
interdependence, even after the Soviet Union’s collapse, countries of the region, 
to provide for overall stability, need to maintain parallel operation of their power 
systems on the basis of intergovernmental agreements.  
Although generally dependent on the level of rainfall, domestic demand and 
water resources available in water reservoirs of major hydropower plants, export 
of electric power to neighboring countries in recent years accounted for significant 
share of generation. According to the Ministry of Energy and Industry of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, in 2011 the volume of electric energy exported by the major 
generation company equaled 2,620 million kWh, about 18 per cent of total 
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amount generated, and brought 73 million US dollars of additional revenue for the 
generation company (Aktalov, 2011). Revenues from export are used to subsidize 
high costs of operating thermal power plants in Bishkek and Osh, two biggest 
cities in the country. These power plants, besides generating electric energy, also 
produce heat energy for central heating of significant parts of the mentioned cities, 
which makes it very difficult to stop their costly and inefficient operations. High 
costs and inefficiency are caused by high price of fuel (coal and fuel oil) and high 
level of technical wear, which according to information of the National Statistics 
Committee equaled 62.5 per cent for Osh TPP and around 50 per cent for Bishkek 
TPP  (Hasanov, et al., 2011) 
As was stated earlier the overwhelming 90 per cent share of electric power 
generation in Kyrgyzstan’s power sector comes from hydropower plants, which 
have great cost advantage in comparison with TPPs. However, hydropower 
generation has limitations of its own. Amount of water resources available for 
power generation depends to great extent on specific climatic conditions of 
current and preceding periods.  Thus, in years with low precipitation level overall 
generation potential of HPPs can significantly decline, requiring careful 
management of production activities and even some rationing of power supply. In 
years 2008 - 2010 Kyrgyzstan experienced the so-called “energy crisis” when 
severe shortage of water resources available for generation required significant 
rationing of power supply to most categories of users. In 2008 power distribution 
companies, facing the necessity of limiting power supply for more than 30 per 
cent, practiced the so-called ‘rolling’ blackouts in the form of sanctioned 
temporary disruptions in power supply for up to 10 hours in some regions. 
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Situation was especially severe in winter when, as a result of cold temperatures 
and rising demand for heating, electricity blackouts increased abruptly also as a 
result of equipment breakdown. This created significant hardships for many 
households, who could not afford or did not have access to more expensive 
alternative types of fuel like coal and natural gas (Hasanov & Izmailov, Chapter 3: 
Kyrgyzstan's Power Sector, 2011). 
 
State Monitoring of the Power Sector  
The Government regulates and controls the power sector via the Ministry of 
Energy and Industry of the Kyrgyz Republic (MEIKR), with subordinate to it 
State Department for Regulating the Fuel and Energy Sector formally acting as 
“Regulator”; and the State Fund for the Management of the State Property (SPF). 
The SPF functions as owner and manager of the public power sector 
companies. It is responsible for design and implementation of development 
strategies (including those related to issues of denationalization and privatization), 
selecting the companies’ management, etc. (Slay, 2011). Currently the SPF is the 
holder of 80.49 per cent stakes in all 7 major corporations of the power sector.  
Remaining shares of the companies’ stocks are held by the Social Fund of the 
Kyrgyz Republic – 13.6 per cent, individual stockholders – 2.32 per cent and legal 
entities – 4,035 per cent. 
The MEIKR is responsible for design and implementation of power sector 
development policies, strategic planning, and assessment and forecasting. The 
“Regulator’s” functions include issuing licenses to power sector companies and 
setting tariffs, which requires efforts to simultaneously balance the interests of 
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energy producers and consumers (Slay, 2011). For diagram, illustrating the power 
sector governance structure in greater details, please see Appendix 1. 
Many experts express the opinion questioning the soundness of current 
division of state oversight functions in the power sector (Hasanov, et al., 2011; 
Abdyrasulova & Kravsov, 2009). Indeed, it makes little sense that while MEIKR 
bears the responsibility for providing sound performance of the power industry 
and overall energetic security, it is the SPF, which is expected to be less 
knowledgeable about many specific aspects of power enterprises’ operations by 
default, makes important decisions related to appointment and suspension of the 
companies’ board members.  
1.1.3 Reforms and Privatization Experience in the Power Sector  
 
Economic liberalization and public sector privatization reforms in Kyrgyzstan 
began soon after independence. The first two-year privatization and 
denationalization program was adopted in January 1992 with the objective of 
privatizing 35 per cent of the state-owned assets (Jermakowicz & Pankow, 1994). 
In the first two-year privatization program priority was given to privatizing 
services and trade sector followed by industry and agriculture (Jermakowicz & 
Pankow, 1994). The implementation of the first privatization program was 
considered as successful with 33.15 per cent of public assets or 4,428 firms 
privatized at the end of the two-year period. As expected most rapid privatization 
was achieved in area of “small scale” privatization in the trade and services 
sectors. By 1992 and 1993 privatization had covered 97.2 per cent of small 
companies in retail trade and food processing, 86.7 per cent of companies in 
14 
 
catering, and all service companies (Privatization in Kyrgyzstan: Country Fact 
Sheet). At the same time, some sectors of the economy initially excluded from 
privatization and still under public ownership are utilities, railways and certain 
mining enterprises (Jermakowicz & Pankow, 1994).  
Mass privatization of medium- and large-scale enterprises in industry, 
transport, and construction sectors was started in 1994 mainly by means of coupon 
privatization (Privatization in Kyrgyzstan: Country Fact Sheet). By the end of 
1997 private sector accounted for 65 per cent of GDP, the highest among all CIS 
countries (Privatization in Kyrgyzstan: Country Fact Sheet). The third stage called 
for privatization large monopolies, including national telecom operator 
“Kyrgyztelekom”, power generator and transmission monopoly “Kyrgyzenergo”, 
national airline “Kyrgyzstan Aba Zholdoru”, etc. (Privatization in Kyrgyzstan: 
Country Fact Sheet). Importantly, it should be noted that privatization reforms in 
late 1990s were supported by the World Bank’s Consolidated Structural 
Adjustment Credit. 
In the power sector liberalization process began only in 1997, when 
government adopted a program of demonopolization and partial privatization of 
the power sector (Hasanov & Izmailov, Chapter 3: Kyrgyzstan's Power Sector, 
2011). Initially implementation of the program was divided into four stages with 
realization planned for 1997-1999. Three of these four stages have already been 
fulfilled. First, “Kyrgyzenergo” was corporatized with 94 per cent of stocks left 
under the state control. Second, control over the company’s auxiliary enterprises 
and socially oriented subdivisions was transferred to local governments (Hasanov 
& Izmailov, Chapter 3: Kyrgyzstan's Power Sector, 2011). 
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The third stage of the reform was carried out in 2001 in the form of 
unbundling of the vertically integrated monopolist “Kyrgyzenergo” into separate 
independent companies, formed on the basis of their functional characteristics 
(Hasanov & Izmailov, Chapter 3: Kyrgyzstan's Power Sector, 2011). This division 
was carried out with the goals of improving performance of the power sector 
companies by creating conditions for the development of competitive 
environment; attracting both domestic and foreign investments into the power 
sector; establishing more effective strategic planning activities, more effective 
management of the power sector enterprises (Abdyrasulova & Kravsov, 2009). 
Although this functional restructuring has resulted in creating a more transparent 
approach for tracking costs on each functional stage and calculation of tariffs, it 
failed to achieve the expected improvement of economic performance of the 
energy system (Abdyrasulova & Kravsov, 2009). Moreover, financial condition of 
the power sector deteriorated along with the reliability of power supply. It can be 
explained by incomplete conduct of the restructuring, lack of effective market 
mechanisms like competition and appropriate legal framework (Abdyrasulova & 
Kravsov, 2009).  
In 2008 the former President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Kurmanbek Bakiev, 
started pushing for invigoration of electricity distribution companies’ 
privatization, arguing that it was needed because the State proved to be the most 
ineffective owner (Yuldasheva, 2008). He pointed out that it was necessary to 
accelerate privatization process, because as long as the state retains control it will 
be impossible to stop theft, embezzlement and SOE’s borrowings from the budget 
(Yuldasheva, 2008).  
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In May 2008 the Government adopted the National Energy Program of the 
Kyrgyz Republic for 2008-2010 and the Development of the Fuel Energy 
Complex to 2025. This program approved privatization of distribution companies, 
which was the main goal of the fourth stage the denationalization and 
privatization program, as one of the main components of policy for the period of 
2008-2010 (The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2008).  
These plans of the ruling elites related to privatization of power sector 
enterprises quickly started to materialize. In late 2008 after assessment of the 
value of assets tenders to privatize the state-owned stock packages of several 
distribution companies was announced. Some of them were bundled together with 
Bishkek Combined Heat and Power Plant and Bishkek centralized heating 
network company.  
Table 1 summarizes chronology of energy companies’ privatization taking 
place in late 2009. 
Decision to privatize these companies aroused negative reaction in the 
society, due to the perceived high level of corruption in the energy sector and lack 
of transparency and integrity in tendering procedures in Kyrgyzstan, which ranked 
164
th
 from 178 countries in the Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index 2010 (Transparency International). As can be seen from the 
Table 1 initial tenders with preset initial minimum bidding price ostensibly failed 
due to the absence of interested bidders. Third attempt to hold privatization 
tenders was conducted without setting the minimum starting price and became 
scandalous as distribution companies were sold for amounts, which were 
miniscule compared to estimates by various experts.  
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The results of these tenders were controversial, to say the least. JSC 
“Severelectro”, whose assets in bundle with the Bishkek Heat and Power Plant 
and Bishkek central heating company, were evaluated to be worth 137 to 613 
million USD, was sold to local company for 3 million USD (Abdyrasulova & 
Kravsov, 2009; Hasanov & Izmailov, 2011). JSC “Vostokelektro” similarly was 
sold for 1.2 million USD to the same buyer. The local acquirer company was 
reportedly founded only a few years ago and thus was unable to present credible 
Source: Energy and Communal Services in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: A 
Poverty and Social Impact Assessment, Slay B. 2011 
Table 1: Energy Sector Privatization Chronology 
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evidence of its ability to successfully manage electricity utility companies (Suhir, 
2010). Moreover, the winning company was allegedly controlled by members of 
the President Bakiev’s family and his immediate environment, which only 
strengthened the public opinion that increasingly larger share of the nation’s 
wealth was being consolidated in the hands of the ruling elite to the detriment of 
the public  (Suhir, 2010). 
  Another vivid example of questionable privatization in Kyrgyzstan is 
privatization of JSC “KyrgyzTelecom”, monopolistic state-owned fixed telephone 
service provider. According to Suhir (2010), its divestiture for 40 million USD 
coupled with immediate simultaneous tariff raise delivered a powerful blow to the 
credibility of privatization process. JSC “Kyrgyztelecom” was sold to a newly 
established consortium of a local Kyrgyzstani company, two off-shore companies 
and one Kazakhstani company, which won bidding competition against large 
telecommunications giants like Russia’s RosTelecom and Turkey’s TurkTelekom 
(Suhir, 2010). 
The case of JSC “KyrgyzTelecom” was very similar to the case of the two 
privatized power distribution companies, “Severelectro” and “Vostokelectro”, 
when tariffs were significantly raised for all categories of consumers soon after 
the privatization was completed. For households tariffs were more than doubled. 
It has been mentioned that significant utility tariff raises and controversial 
privatization in the context of worsening quality of life and rising poverty were 
among the primary reasons leading to revolution of April 2010. Therefore, in 
order to stabilize the situation, one of the first decisions of the interim post-
revolutionary government was to revert the tariffs for households to the original 
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level, at the same time, tariffs for other categories of consumers were somewhat 
reduced but were not reverted to the original level. There are opinions that the 
decision to revert tariffs for households was just a populist decision necessary for 
stabilizing the situation during the turmoil after the revolution. However, keeping 
current level of tariffs is a short-sighted policy, which will bring about further 
deterioration of the power infrastructure.  
After the revolution the interim Government nationalized all SOEs privatized 
in dubious manner, including those discussed in earlier in this section, as well as 
other property, acquired by the former President’s family members and people in 
his environment. 
Taking into account the widespread public discontent caused by privatization 
of SOE’s under Bakiev, it is not surprising that the new government preferred 
following policies, which emphasized strengthening state control over power 
sector enterprises with the objective of improving management practices and 
curtailing corruption (Hasanov & Izmailov, Chapter 3: Kyrgyzstan's Power 
Sector, 2011). It is argued that this effectively means the suspension of market 
reforms in the energy sector after the revolution (Hasanov & Izmailov, Chapter 3: 
Kyrgyzstan's Power Sector, 2011). Taking into account that decisions to revert the 
tariffs and to nationalize recently privatized enterprises were among the most 
important ones made after the revolution, it will be difficult for the new 
government to come up with privatization and tariff raise initiatives in the short 
term.  
The post-revolution time interim President, Rosa Otunbaeva, signed a Decree 
stipulating for the introduction of transparency and public accountability 
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principles into operations of the power sector. In pursuance of the Decree, in the 
fall of 2010 Supervisory Board on Fuel and Energy Sector Transparency Initiative 
(FESTI) was created. The Board is a supervisory and advisory body under the 
Ministry of Energy of Kyrgyz Republic, consisting of representatives of 
government agencies, NGOs and enterprises of fuel and energy complex 
enterprises (FESTI).  
Under current legal provisions privatization of PDCs is still possible, 
although after April 2010 the focus was on improving state control, which should 
result in better management and decrease in the scale of corruption (Hasanov & 
Izmailov, Chapter 3: Kyrgyzstan's Power Sector, 2011). It has to be noted that 
after the revolution of 2010 significant changes were introduced into privatization 
procedures. Privatization auctions and tenders can no longer be conducted without 
setting a fixed minimum bidding price (The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
2012). With regard to the privatization process the emphasis nowadays is put on 
principles of transparency and accountability before the Parliament (Jogorku 
Kenesh of KR) and society. In the realization of these principles, the composition 
of privatization commission was changed and must include members of the 
Parliament, representatives of NGOs, law-enforcement agencies and other 
supervisory bodies (The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2012).  
Privatization of electricity distribution companies initially was planned in the 
form of divestiture to large strategic investors with proven record of successfully 
operating electric utility businesses. Experts argue that even after the revolution 
privatization of PDCs is possible if carried out in accordance with the law and 
principles of transparency and accountability (Hasanov & Izmailov, Chapter 3: 
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Kyrgyzstan's Power Sector, 2011). In this case, privatization could bring capital 
and know-how necessary for modernizing electricity infrastructure, reducing 
losses, finally resulting in higher efficiency and better financial performance 
(Hasanov & Izmailov, Chapter 3: Kyrgyzstan's Power Sector, 2011). 
1.1.4 Social Importance of Electricity Services in the Kyrgyz Republic 
 
Access to electric energy is very important for both economic and social 
development. Currently 98 per cent of population in Kyrgyzstan has access to 
electricity supply services, with the exception of several dozens of small villages 
located in remote and mountainous areas (Abdyrasulova & Kravsov, 2009). 
Despite the widespread use of electricity services, in terms of per capita electric 
energy consumption with 1,351 kWh per year Kyrgyzstan lags behind the world 
average of 2,343 kWh. 
According to Winkler et al. (2011) providing affordable access to reliable and 
modern energy services is a very important objective in many developing 
countries. “Affordable” is a very relevant term for Kyrgyzstan, where still a large 
share of population lives beyond poverty line. In 2011 about 33.7 per cent of 
population lived beyond the poverty line (www.indexmundi.com). Therefore, 
access to reasonably priced commodities is vital for the provision of minimally 
acceptable living standards for the poor. Figure 4 illustrates the percentage of 
population living beyond poverty line trend in Kyrgyzstan for the period of 1993 – 
2011.  
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In 2011 United Nations Development Program sponsored a poverty and 
social impact assessment of current policy and reform trends in the energy and 
communal services sectors in Kyrgyzstan (Slay, 2011). As has already been 
mentioned, reliability of electricity supply in Kyrgyzstan leaves much to be 
Source: www.indexmundi.com 
Figure 4: Population below Poverty Line (%) 
Source: Energy and Communal Services in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: A Poverty and 
Social Impact Assessment, Slay B. 2011 
Figure 5: Share of Households' Spending on Different Types of Energy (2009) 
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desired, and according to the UNDP report in 2008 weekly interruptions of 
electricity services were reported by 72 per cent of households in the country as a 
whole 78 per cent for rural areas (Slay, 2011). Percentage of the poor living in 
rural areas in Kyrgyzstan noticeably exceeds that for urban areas. In 2008 overall 
poverty rate in the capital city Bishkek equaled 15.2 per cent, while in most of the 
other regions it exceeded 40 per cent (Slay, 2011). During winter seasons 
households living in rural areas for heating rely mostly on coal and electricity; 
while in urban areas, due to the higher level of infrastructure development and 
higher income level, consumers have wider choice of energy sources to rely on 
(Slay, 2011). These include services of central heating, gas and hot water supply. 
Therefore, from the previous two sentences it is possible to draw a conclusion that 
the poorest households are those who suffer from interruptions in electricity 
supply the most (Slay, 2011).  
Social policy in Kyrgyzstan is conducted ineffectively. One of the most 
evident indications of failure to provide effective social aid is the fact that the 
country’s poor citizens get only about half of the benefits allocated by the state 
(Slay, 2011).  According to official data the share of low-income households in 
the pool of benefit recipients in 2008-2010 even dropped down from 52 per cent 
to 50 per cent, while share of upper-income households increased from 6 to 13 
percent (Slay, 2011). Thus, significant portion of the increased social spending 
aimed at mitigating the impact of the crisis developments of 2009-2010 seems to 
have benefited relatively wealthy households. See Appendix 2 for illustration on 
the distribution of social benefits among different classes of population in 
Kyrgyzstan.  
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According to Winkler et al. (2011) affordability of energy is commonly 
judged on the basis of calculating energy expenditure burden for households as a 
share of disposable income. Earlier it was emphasized that the drastic increase of 
the energy tariffs in January 2010 was one of the key reasons leading to the 
revolution of 2010. However, official household survey data suggests that the 
percentage of spending on energy in the total consumption volume in Kyrgyzstan 
is low by international standards (Slay, 2011). Figure 6 illustrates the trend of the 
change in households’ spending on energy for the period from 2006 to the second 
half of 2010. 
Slay (2011) argues that surprisingly in Kyrgyzstan even poorest citizens pay 
tariffs that are far below affordable levels, because national average spending on 
energy accounts for only about 6 per cent of the total spending, while international 
Source: Energy and Communal Services in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan: A Poverty and Social Impact Assessment, Slay B. 2011 
Figure 6: Share of Households' Spending Devoted to Energy (2009) 
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benchmarks used by WB, UN and others vary in the range of 15-20 per cent. And 
in Kyrgyzstan even for the poorest tier of households the percentage of spending 
on energy did not exceed 10 per cent, which testifies to the relative affordability 
of electricity for all social classes (Slay, 2011). Use of 10 per cent as a threshold is 
widely accepted as an indicator for judging on negligibility of spending on energy 
(Winkler et al, 2011).  
In 2008 USAID conducted a study similar to the abovementioned one carried 
out by UNDP. The study draws attention to the fact that use of electricity for 
heating purposes has dramatically increased since 2004-2005 levels (Slay, 2011). 
Another finding of the study was that electricity for heating and cooking is mostly 
used by urban poor and extremely poor segments of population, which do not 
have access to other sources of energy such as central heating and gas (Slay, 
2011). This can be interpreted as an indication of the “inferior good” characteristic 
of electricity in Kyrgyzstan, meaning the high level of reliance on it by the poorest 
people living in both urban and rural areas (Slay, 2011). When it comes to the 
possible means of mitigating of the impact that higher tariffs might have on low-
income households, Slay (2011) argues that “block” or “lifeline” 1  electricity 
tariffs could prove effective. Tallapragada et al. (2009) also maintain that tariffs 
increasing steeply with increase in consumption are effective from affordability 
perspective as they provide affordable access to poorest layers of population and 
enables subsidization of their tariff by more affluent people, whose level of 
consumption would fall into higher-tariff zone.  
                                                          
1
 “Block” tariffs are those, in which the charge is based on different kWh rates applying to 
successive kWh blocks of given size, supplied during a specified period; 
“lifeline” electricity tariffs rise with greater amounts of electricity consumption 
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1.2 Statement of the Problem 
 
Electric power plays immensely important role in the economic and social life of 
Kyrgyzstan. It has become one of the basic utilities like water supply, with 
constant access to it defining the minimum acceptable living standards in modern 
technology-based world. Therefore, every government should consider providing 
people with access to affordable and quality electricity supply services as one of 
its basic responsibilities. 
Power sector enterprises’ operational and financial inefficiency, as well as the 
capital equipment’s wear and tear pose significant threat for overall energetic 
security in Kyrgyzstan. Poor technical condition of electricity distribution 
networks and excessive demand result in low voltage and large number of 
emergency outages, which is an indication of low quality and unreliability of 
service. 
Low socially oriented tariffs, high system losses, inability of power 
distribution companies to collect payments for supplied electricity are often 
named as reasons for energy companies’ lackluster performance.  
However, many experts argue that another important factor, contributing to 
meager financial and operational performance, is rent-seeking activities such as 
corruption, bribery and other illicit activities deeply entrenched in the power 
sector. Public ownership of the power sector SOEs has been frequently mentioned 
as the key reason for high inefficiency and corruption within the sector.  
1.3 Research Objectives 
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The research was conducted in order to achieve deep understanding of 
factors, causing the inefficiency of power sector enterprises.  
Especially important was to define types of rent-seeking activities and rents 
inherent in the operations of the power sector and to analyze what implications 
they might have for efficiency of power sector SOEs. 
It is also important to research reasons why privatization of electric energy 
distribution companies, which for a long time was presented as a possible remedy 
for the companies’ efficiency problems, is likely to cause contraction of 
corruption and other inefficient rent-seeking activities in the power sector, thus 
bringing about improvement in performance.  
1.4 Significance of Research 
 
There are numerous studies and reports, discussing the issues of power 
sector enterprises’ inefficiency in the Kyrgyz Republic, which are available to the 
public. However, the author has not come across any that looked at those issues 
through prism of the rent-seeking theory. This thesis is expected to contribute to 
the knowledge body, dedicated to analyzing operations of the Kyrgyzstani power 
sector, and trying to define major factors causing the inefficiency, with particular 
emphasis on the role of corruption and patronage.  
Also this study seeks to investigate theoretical basis and empirical results of 
privatization reforms in other developing and transition countries of the world. 
This is done to make a forecast of possible effects that privatization might have on 
performance of the power sector enterprises. 
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This research can prove useful for people conducting research related to 
assessing performance of electric utilities, implications of rent-seeking activities 
and corruption on efficiency of SOEs in developing countries, problems of 
economic transition in countries of Central Asia, etc.  
Findings of this study, taking into account the author’s direct involvement in 
the Kyrgyzstani power sector as a policy maker, can potentially be reflected in 
future public policies, regulating operations of the power sector in Kyrgyzstan.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Efficiency of Electricity Distribution  
 
Assessment of the efficiency of PDCs in KR in this thesis will be done 
based on several key indicators, which were identified as important for providing 
benchmarking analysis of electric utility sectors’ performance in the World 
Bank’s report, providing comparison between Sub-Saharan Africa countries 
(Tallapragada V.S.N., Shkaratan, Izaguirre, Helleranta, Rakhman, & Bergman, 
2009).  
Key performance indicators, used by the authors of the abovementioned 
report for benchmarking, include such indicators as system losses of electricity, 
capacity and load factors, number of outages, residential tariffs, accounts 
receivable and many others. While recognizing importance of all these indicators, 
due to limitations in the data available and specific hydropower-dependent 
character of the Kyrgyzstan’s energy system, for assessing efficiency of electricity 
distribution companies in the Kyrgyz Republic the author decided to focus on 
several indices. These are technical and non-technical (commercial) losses of 
energy, payment collection rate and accounts receivable in days. 
Total system losses – equal to the difference between the volume of power 
supplied to the electricity distribution grid in a country and the volume of power 
billed to customers.  
System losses are composed of technical losses and non-technical losses, 
which result from use of poor metering equipment, encryption losses in billing 
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and fraudulent activities such as meter tampering, unauthorized use or theft of 
power (Tallapragada et al., 2009). According to the methodology used in the 
report, total system losses do not include collection losses resulting from 
customers’ unwillingness or inability to pay, billing and collecting failures. Thus, 
system losses directly measures technical efficiency of utility operations and only 
partially reflects commercial efficiency, because it takes account of billing and 
metering errors, and electricity pilfering, but excludes incomplete collection of 
billed payments (Tallapragada et al., 2009) 
Tallapragada et al. (2009) argue that system losses is one of the most 
important indicators for developing countries since it affects both financial and 
commercial aspects of performance and therefore is a sign of the overall 
performance and efficiency of a utility company. In many situations reducing 
system losses is a way to quickly improve financial performance of utility 
enterprises (Tallapragada et al., 2009). 
Tariff collection rate and accounts receivable in days (days of sales 
outstanding) are closely related important indicators of electric utility companies’ 
performance, showing the speed and effectiveness of payment collection 
(Tallapragada et al., 2009). 
The formula used for calculation of accounts receivable in days, also 
called the average collection period, in days is: 
Accounts receivable in days = Year end accounts receivable / 
(Annual    operating revenue / 365 days) 
The less this indicator the more financially efficient the utility company is 
(Tallapragada et al., 2009).  
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2.2 Rent-Seeking and Corruption 
2.2.1 Rents 
 
Discussion of rents, rent-seeking and corruption in this paper is based 
primarily upon contribution of Mushtaq H. Khan. 
The classical definition of rents provided in the economics literature is of 
income higher than the minimum that would be accepted in the next best 
opportunity of the economic agent in question (Khan, 2000). Khan’s view of rents 
is radically different from that of the classical economics, which holds that all 
rents negatively affect growth. He argues that in real world scenarios different 
types of rents might have different implications for economic growth. Effect of 
some rents can be leading to inefficiency and impeding growth, whereas other 
rents can have growth-facilitating effects, especially in developing countries 
(Khan, "Rents, Efficiency and Growth", "Rent-seeking as Process", 2000). 
Therefore, Khan (2000) holds that capacity to recognize good and bad rents might 
be crucial for policy makers and analysts for effectively managing development.  
Neoclassical economic literature discussing rents was devoted mostly to 
the analysis of monopoly rents and their adverse effects on efficiency (Khan, 
2000). Apart from monopoly rents Khan (2000) describes the following types of 
rents to be identified in real world: natural resource rents, politically organized 
transfers, Schumpeterian rents, rents for learning and rents for good management. 
According to the neoclassical analysis of markets, monopoly rents are 
considered to be signs of inefficiency, since as a result of absence of competition 
in monopolistic markets a monopolist is able to reap profits by limiting supply 
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and keeping prices high, which, in turn, will be leading to reduction in the overall 
social benefits by decreasing both consumer and producer surpluses (Khan, 2000). 
Khan (2000) suggests that monopoly rents themselves do not directly represent 
social cost, but he points out that these rents signal about inefficiency of 
allocation. 
Khan (200) suggests that natural monopolies, such as in the area of 
providing utility services, are different from other monopolies as their 
monopolistic status is not the result of artificial market entry barriers, but is rather 
a condition necessitated by economies of scale. Khan (2000) argues that when 
analyzing natural monopolies the social costs in the form of deadweight welfare 
loss should be compared with the costs of breaking monopoly up into many 
smaller units, which would each have higher marginal costs. In this case the best 
suggested policy would be to keep monopoly, but to regulate its operations and 
provide subsidies as incentives for increasing production volumes up to optimal 
level (Khan, 2010). 
Rents based on transfers are created through political mechanism (Khan, 
2000). In developing countries transfers in the form of taxes and subsidies often 
serve as a basis for asset accumulation and emergence of middle class and new 
capitalists (Khan, 2000). The transfer mechanisms involved in creation of rents 
include taxes, subsidies and legal and illegal transfers related to privatizing public 
property (Khan, 2000).  
In order for capitalists to emerge, creation of capitalist property is needed 
(Khan, 2000). Khan (2000) argues that this in turn requires transfers that would be 
effectively resulting in “necessary” primitive accumulation and not “unnecessary” 
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one, which is associated with increase in corruption and theft. In many developing 
countries transfers play important role in provision of political stability, however, 
taking into consideration, as Khan (2000) characterizes it, “unfairness inherent to 
processes of primitive accumulation” creates opportunity for political 
intermediaries to appropriate substantial portions of the transfers. Thus effects, 
which transfers might have on growth, can be positive or negative depending on 
incentives for transitioning to productive capitalism that recipients of the 
significant share of those transfers have (Khan, 2000). For this reason, in some 
countries transfers resulted in rapid accumulation and capitalist growth, while in 
others in large-scale theft and outflow of resources to foreign banks (Khan, 2000). 
Hence, assessment of potential economic implications of this type of rents in 
developing economies is very difficult and will require careful analysis of 
distribution of political power, incentives of different competing groups for 
channeling transferred resources to investments within the economy in question 
(Khan, 2000).  
Natural resource rents is income gained by owners of scarce natural 
resources, and contrary to monopoly rents the existence of natural resource rents 
often signals about efficiency in resource allocation and may be required for 
growth (Khan, 2000). Moreover it is socially desirable to maximize natural 
resource rents (Khan, 2000). 
Schumpeterian rents are generated as a result of innovation and new 
information creation and are vital for facilitating growth and development (Khan, 
2000). Information rents, much like innovation rents, are source of higher than 
acceptable returns and are important in making markets in developing countries, 
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permeated by asymmetric information, work (Khan, 2000). In developing 
countries, as argued by Khan (2000) information rents are often much higher than 
in developed countries due to weak information dissemination institutions. 
According to Khan (2000), rents for learning are mostly responsible for leading 
growth in developing counties as they reward firms for adopting technologies 
already well known in advanced countries.  
Monitoring rents (Khan, 2000) are returns serving as incentives for 
providing good management. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argued that if owners 
of cooperating inputs agree with the monitor (manager) that he or she is to receive 
the residual above prescribed amounts, he will have increased incentives to 
perform his monitoring (management) functions better. Asymmetric information 
Source: Ch. 1 “Rents, Efficiency and Growth” from Khan and Jomo (2000) 
Figure 7: Relevant Growth and Efficiency Implications of Different Rents 
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is thought to play crucial role in Alchian and Demsetz’s argument, since it may be 
costly for managers to uncover facts about employees’ real efforts on the job 
(Khan, 2000). These rents like information-generation and innovation rents are 
considered efficient taking into account the costliness of information (Khan, 
2000). Figure 7 below summarizes Khan’s arguments about growth and efficiency 
implications of different rent types. 
Classical (Marxian analysis) economics holds that economic surplus 
(rents) is essential for growth, hence the latter will be damaged if the surplus is 
misallocated to non-productive uses or consumed by parasitic capitalists (Khan, 
2000). Also in accordance with the classical theory, the main role of the surplus 
(rents) is in its acting as a source for accumulation (Khan, 2000). The neoclassical 
theory looks at rents as provider of incentives for innovation, learning, 
information generation, monitoring, etc. rather than direct source of investments 
(Khan, 2000). 
Khan (2000) demonstrated that it is difficult to differentiate between 
efficient and inefficient rents and that sometimes presence of rents can be signs of 
dynamic and efficient economy while their absence can sometimes signal 
inefficiency and stagnation.  
Having discussed basic theory of rents and their types, we need to continue 
our theoretical discussion with coverage of rent-seeking activities, which will later 
allow us to analyze rents and rent-seeking activities observed in Kyrgyzstan’s 
power sector.  
2.2.2 Rent-Seeking 
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According to Khan (2000) rent-seeking is the expenditure of resources and 
effort in creating, maintaining and transferring rents. These expenditures can 
come in legal forms, like lobbying, queuing or contributions to political parties, 
and illegal - bribes, illegal political contributions, etc. (Khan, 2000). In his 
discussion of rents Khan (2000) demonstrated that rents are closely related to the 
economic rights underpinning them. For this reason, rent-seeking is related to 
processes of institutional change, which alter the very economic rights defining 
rents. The outcomes of the institutional change depend on a multitude of variables 
including incentives created by previous institutional settings (Khan, 2000). Khan 
(2000) suggests that political variables, especially the distribution of political 
power, can determine winners and losers in distributive contests. This means that 
a more general approach to analyzing rent-seeking should include consideration of 
political and institutional variables to explain how much effort is put into rent-
seeking and types of rights and rents created as a result (Khan, 2000).  
According to Khan (2000) when assessing the net effect of a rent-seeking 
process, one should not limit himself with considering only the rent-seeking costs 
(input part) of the issue but extend the analysis by considering the rents created as 
well (output part). Thus, Khan’s (2000) main argument is that rent-seeking is a 
process, whose overall effect is dependent on two related components: net social 
cost or benefit associated with the rents and social costs of activities aiming to 
create, maintain and reallocate those rents. 
However, analysis of rent-seeking should also embrace consideration of 
who participates in the process. Khan (2000) argues that consideration of patron-
client networks involved in organization of rent-seeking in developing countries, 
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relative power of classes and groups involved can provide valuable insight into 
social and political aspects of the rent-seeking process.   
2.2.3 Corruption and Patron-Client Networks 
 
Khan (2000) maintains that in developing countries a meaningful share of 
rent-seeking expenditures is spent in patron-client networks and most of rents 
resulting are also often distributed within these networks. According to Khan 
(2000) large share of these expenditures is illegal and comes in the form of 
payoffs to political factions to retain their allegiance, payments to mafia bosses, 
etc. Such inputs maintain the organizational power of patrons, which is often 
critical for winning rent-seeking contests (Khan, 2000). 
Khan (2000) argues that rent-seeking, which was endemic in both 
developing and developed countries, is more extensive in the former, more often 
appears in illegal forms and is more damaging for growth. According to Khan 
(2000) difference in the economic performance of different countries depend more 
on the types of rents created as a result of rent-seeking activities and less on the 
size of the rent-seeking expenditures.  
In his discussion of implications that bribes in patron-client networks have 
on economic growth Khan (1996) argues that it is determined by the type of 
patron-client networks prevalent in a country. He distinguishes between 
patrimonial and clientelist patron-client networks. Patrimonial patron-client 
networks are defined as present when state is able to protect existing property 
rights at low cost and are not typical for developing countries (Khan, The 
Efficiency Implications of Corruption, 1996). In clientelist patron-client networks 
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state officials, on the contrary, are unable to enforce rights, which means that 
these “clientelist” groups will have the opportunity to control rights. Khan (1996) 
argues that under patrimonial networks state officials would have incentives to 
create long-term productive rights meaning that inputs from the rent-seeking will 
not be withdrawn from the production function. In clientelist network based 
economies, where there are many such networks competing for power, due to 
increased volatility nobody would be ready to create long-term rights (Khan, 
1996).       
2.2.4 Cronyism and Economic Performance 
 
Analysis of rent-seeking in a specific country can be supplemented by 
David Kang’s (2003) argument that economic growth can be dependent on the 
number of competitors participating in a rent-seeking process.  
In new institutional economics the term cronyism is used to refer to 
structures, in which such phenomena as bribery, corruption, family and personal 
ties, patron-client networks are closely intertwined (Kang, 2003). Since under 
cronyism decisions are made based on nonmarket principles, the scope for rent-
seeking is broadly increased, economic incentives are distorted, etc.; cronyism is 
often considered as harmful for economic growth and efficiency (Kang, 2003). 
However, Kang (2003) argues that some types of cronyism can be effective in 
decreasing transaction costs, which represent a major problem for economic 
growth in all countries. He affirms (Kang, 2003) that transaction costs are lower 
the lower the number of participants in a rent-seeking process. Using several 
Asian countries as examples, Kang tried to demonstrate how this principle works 
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in real life scenarios. Kang explains that in South Korea transaction costs were 
low due to the established system of “mutual hostages” between business and 
government elites. “Mutual hostages” exist when there are a small and stable 
number of government and business actors, who have significant vulnerability to 
each other. This allows them to limit opportunism of the other party, while 
maintaining the incentive for continuing cooperation (Kang, 2003).  
On the contrary, in Philippines transaction costs were high, which was the 
cause of lower economic efficiency, due to big number of actors, which were 
highly volatile in their political standings and found it difficult to reach long-term 
political stability (Kang, 2003).  
2.2.5 Corruption in Electric Utilities 
 
Dal Bo and Rossi conducted a study seeking to define the relationship 
between corruption and efficiency of electricity distribution enterprises in Latin 
America (2007). Data of 80 companies from 13 Latin American companies for the 
period 1994-2001 was analyzed. Dal Bo and Rossi’s (2007) main finding was that 
corruption is strongly correlated to the inefficiency of firms. The authors’ 
explanation was that corruption might be affecting efficiency by diverting 
managerial efforts from supervision and coordination of the productive process, 
thus implying that the more corrupt countries, the less efficient are firms (Dal Bo 
& Rossi, 2007). Another important finding of the study was that private firms 
were much more efficient in the use of labor compared to public enterprises. 
2.3 Analytical Framework 
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Analysis of effects that rent-seeking activities in the power sector have on 
performance of electric energy utilities is based on the analytical framework, 
developed by Khan (2000) and used by Suzuki (2001) for analyzing rent-seeking 
activities’ impact on India’s electric power development. 
The model allows analyzing both inputs and outputs of rent-seeking 
processes. Suzuki (2001) argues that analyzing “structure of rights” (“outputs” of 
rent-seeking) will help define the relationships between input and output sides of 
any rent-seeking activities in different countries or institutions. In this thesis 
Khan’s framework is used to analyze Kyrgyzstan’s indigenous “structure of 
rights” as related to the power sector to analyze how rent-seeking activities in the 
sector (corruption, bribery, etc.) affect operational and financial performance of 
the sector’s SOEs. 
The model is based on Khan’s perspective on the rent-seeking process laid 
down in the rent-seeking section of this chapter. Figure 8  graphically illustrates 
Khan’s (2000) framework looking at rent-seeking as a process, whose overall 
effect is dependent on two related components: net social cost or benefit 
associated with the rents (output of rent-seeking) and social costs of activities 
aiming to create, maintain and reallocate those rents (input of rent-seeking). 
Khan (2000) explains his framework as follows. The existing structure of 
economic rights is shown at the top of the diagram. This structure defines 
incentives affecting allocation of resources between production and rent-seeking 
activities. Resources that are channeled into production increase “final outputs” in 
the form of goods and services thus causing an increase in the net social benefit. 
This process is called by Khan the “conventional production” and is represented 
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on the diagram by the horizontal box. According to Suzuki (2001) these “final 
outputs” determine growth and efficiency of the economy. 
 Khan (2000) explains that concurrently with putting resources into 
production, some share of those resources is allocated to rent-seeking activities, 
shown in the vertically placed box. Starting position for rent-seeking process is 
the existing structure of rights, which at the end of rent-seeking cycle can be 
reproduced in its original form or altered, thus changing the starting conditions for 
the new round of rent-seeking (Khan, 2000).  
This model helps to see two possible effects of rent-seeking (Khan, 2000). 
The first effect is the loss of final output resulting from withdrawal of resources 
from production and transferring them as inputs into rent-seeking. This loss is the 
input cost of the rent-seeking and represents decrease in net social benefits. The 
second effect pertains to creation, maintenance and reallocation of rents (Khan, 
Source: Ch. 2 “Rent-seeking as Process”  from Khan and Jomo (2000)  
Figure 8: Analytical Model: Interface of Conventional Production and Rent-Seeking 
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2000). It is measured by the difference between the net social benefit with the 
rights created by a specific type of rent-seeking and the net social benefit which 
would have obtained without these rights (Khan, 2000). This means that certain 
structures of rights can have positive or negative implications for efficiency and 
growth under certain resource allocation scenarios. Suzuki (2001) argues that, 
although according to Khan the most accurate assessment of the net effect of rent-
seeking is done when combining the effects from both, the model demonstrates 
that analysis of the structure of rights is greatly outweighed.   
2.4 Privatization 
 
At the end of the twentieth century the world witnessed significant 
changes in the political and economic landscape, including mass collapse of 
communism order in the previously powerful block of socialist states. Mass 
transition of post-communist countries to capitalism all over the world 
necessitated drastic economic reforms.  
2.4.1 Reasons for Privatization 
 
Privatization started in late 1970s in Thatcherist Great Britain following 
disappointment with dismal performance of SOEs and sluggish economic 
performance of socialist states (Guriev & Megginson, 2007). Since then tens of 
thousands of firms in more than 100 countries have been privatized (Guriev & 
Megginson, 2007).   
Basic argument for privatization is that by strengthening the incentives for 
profit maximization previously absent in state-owned enterprises it should result 
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in improved performance (Guriev & Megginson, 2007; Sheshinski & Lopez-
Calva, 2003).  
Low efficiency and poor performance of public enterprises is frequently 
named as the primary reason for privatization (Boycko, Shleifer, & Wishny, 
1996). According to Boycko, Shleifer and Wishny (1996) inefficiency of public 
enterprises can to a large extent be explained by the SOEs’ being controlled by 
politicians, who force them to pursue strategies maximizing payoffs for 
politicians. Among these strategies maintaining excess employment is the most 
frequently mentioned politically requested inefficiency driver (Boycko, Shleifer, 
& Wishny, 1996). Due to such view of excess employment Boycko, Shleifer and 
Wishny (1996) define privatization as “reallocation of control rights over 
employment from politicians to managers and increase in the cash flow ownership 
of managers and private investors”.  
In his discussion of differences between public and private ownership, 
Shleifer (1998) argues that the social justification of the need for government 
ownership is weak when patronage
2
 is widespread, like in many developing 
countries.   
Another example of politicians’ using SOEs to win political support can be 
seen in cases where tariffs or prices charged by SOEs are significantly lower than 
marginal costs (Shleifer & Wishny, Politicians and Firms, 1994; Yarrow, A 
Theory of Privatization, or Why Bureaucrats are Still in Business, 1999).  
                                                          
2
 According to Shleifer (1998), patronage is the transfer of wealth to constituents  through the 
use of government-owned assets in exchange for political support 
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According to Yarrow (1999) and Wood (2004) it is the fiscal pressure that 
is the most common trigger for privatization and SOE reforms. Yarrow (1999) 
explains that governments of many countries throughout much of the twentieth 
century faced constant pressure to increase public expenditures, which in turn 
caused an increase in the opportunity costs of public finance. This has widely 
resulted in cuts in public investment programs, SOE budgets and divestitures of 
SOEs (Yarrow, A Theory of Privatization, or Why Bureaucrats are Still in 
Business, 1999). As a result of growing fiscal pressure, liquidity-constrained 
governments started to have stronger incentives to conduct privatization in order 
to raise funds through divestiture of SOEs and to eliminate public subsidies 
(Wood, 2004). 
Besides internal causal factors decisions to privatize public sector 
enterprises in many developing countries were influenced by major international 
financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, which were both highly committed to including privatization in their 
lending conditionality packages (Wood, 2004). The privatization trend in the late 
1980s and 1990s was partially triggered by increasing requests for privatization 
reforms into conditions of structural adjustment lending by the named 
international financial organizations (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1997).  
2.4.2 Incentives and Agency Problems 
 
Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (2003) argue that inefficiency of public firms 
is caused by the incentives and contracting problems. SOE managers’ incentives 
are distorted because they have to follow strategies imposed by politicians and not 
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those dictated by the market, and due to lenient monitoring requirements for their 
performance imposed by government officials (Sheshinski & Lopez-Calva, 2003).  
According to Yarrow (1986) effect of privatization on economic 
performance is indirect and is applied through behavioral changes, caused by 
shifts in incentives. Yarrow (1999) argues that one of the main conclusions to be 
drawn from the economic analysis of privatization is that the policy environments, 
in which firms operate, are outcomes of incentive structures faced by policy 
makers, who, in their turn, depend on many political and institutional factors, such 
as interest group pressures, the balance of political forces, bureaucratic goals, the 
influence of public opinion, etc. Viewed from this perspective privatization can be 
defined, as a means of reducing the impact of political factors on economic 
incentives, behavior and performance (Yarrow, A Theory of Privatization, or Why 
Bureaucrats are Still in Business, 1999). 
According to Yarrow (1999), in regulated monopolies, where existence of 
significant asymmetry of information is a norm, there is a lack of dynamic 
incentives to discover and reveal new information previously unknown to both 
managers and regulators. As a result it is likely that neither monopolist nor 
regulator might be aware of real marginal costs.  
Critical agency problem is more related to politicians than managers 
(Boycko, Shleifer, & Wishny, 1996). Shleifer and Wishny (1994) argue that SOEs 
are inefficient not only as a result of managers’ having weak incentives to reduce 
costs but because of the government’s deliberate policy of using them to transfer 
resources to supporters. Shleifer (1998) argues that elimination of politically 
motivated resource allocation has been the main positive effect of privatization, 
46 
 
because politicians tend to care more about own political interests and maximizing 
personal wealth rather than increasing social welfare. Therefore, privatization 
works, because it separates politicians from controlling firms (Boycko, Shleifer, & 
Wishny, 1996). 
One of the reasons for poor efficiency of public enterprises is in the soft 
budget constraint (SBC) faced by the management. The term initially was used to 
refer to governments’ bailing out state-owned firms in financial distress through 
subsidies and other instruments, but later its use spread to other fields as well 
(Kornai, Maskin, & Roland, 2003). In order to maintain employment governments 
often bail out firms in financial distress, both private and public (Guriev & 
Megginson, 2007; Sheshinski & Lopez-Calva, 2003). The SBC is the reason 
significantly weakening managers’ incentives to improve efficiency due to 
elimination of the bankruptcy risks (Guriev & Megginson, 2007).  
Schmidt (Schmidt K. M., 1996) proposes to look at privatization and 
nationalization as different “governance structures”, which provide for different 
incentives for the management to save costs. Schmidt (1996) argues that 
privatization reduces the amount of information that politicians have, which may 
lead to the reduction of subsidies and restructuring. It is further argued that, since 
after privatization managers cannot rely on government’s financial support, 
ensuing hardening of budget constraints will create incentives for managers to 
improve efficiency (invest into cost reduction). However, as admitted by Schmidt 
(1996) his model makes strong assumptions both about the role of the government 
as fully-rational and benevolent decision maker, and about absence of rent-
seeking activities. 
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Another problem, causing weak incentives of SOE managers, is the poor 
monitoring of their performance. It stems from the fact that SOEs’ shares are not 
traded in the market, which eliminates hostile takeover threat (Sheshinski & 
Lopez-Calva, 2003).  
2.4.3 Empirical Evidence of Post-Privatization Performance 
 
Majority of researchers, discussing privatization and its impact on 
performance of previously state-owned enterprises, agree that the former 
generally positively affects overall efficiency in privatized firms and leads to 
increased profitability and better financial health (Sheshinski & Lopez-Calva, 
2003; Guriev & Megginson, 2007).   
In some cases, privatization is an effective mechanism for achieving 
efficiency gains, taking into consideration that in many countries majority of 
SOEs were low-performing and reforms achieved a rather modest success (Wood, 
2004). Increased factor productivity, significant cost reductions and diminished 
need to provide subsidies were the other effects observed (Wood, 2004).  
Evidence shows that privatization has brought about not only improvement 
in profitability and efficiency but also increase in the volume of capital 
expenditures (Sheshinski & Lopez-Calva, 2003). 
Privatization reforms yielded different results in different countries. In 
2007 Guriev and Megginson conducted a comprehensive overview of empirical 
literature on privatization experience around the world. Their (Guriev & 
Megginson, 2007) general conclusion made on the basis of the research is that 
there is a solid evidence for “general” effectiveness of privatization in improving 
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productivity, which was improved on average by 20 per cent and more than 
doubled in certain cases. Also it is stated that expectation of overall negative 
effects that privatization might cause have for economies are not justified. 
Another very important empirical finding is that it was observed that 
performance contracts, corporatization and imposing hard budget constraints on 
SOEs do not work unless those are privatized (Guriev & Megginson, 2007). 
In transition countries success of privatization to a large extent is 
dependent on complementary institutionary reforms such as introduction of the 
rule-of-law, hard budget constraints, competition and providing protection to 
investors (Guriev & Megginson, 2007). In the absence of those privatization is 
said to have had even negative consequences for economic performance (Guriev 
& Megginson, 2007). In Russia, Ukraine and other CIS countries, where 
participation of foreign investors in initial privatization was ruled out due to 
ideological reasons, privatization resulted in insider dominated non-cash 
privatizations, leading to creation of a small number of large so called 
“oligarchic” business groups (Guriev & Megginson, 2007). However, as argued 
by Guriev and Megginson (2007) despite initial failure of privatization in Russia 
we can see that gradual post-privatization reallocation is leading to creation of 
efficient ownership structure.       
Implications for Welfare 
A major concern of the public as related to the privatization of public 
utilities is that it is likely to cause negative implications for social welfare. The 
logic is that private investors, who are portrayed as purely capitalist minded 
profit-seekers caring about nothing but own financial benefit, will only make 
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efforts to maximize profits at the expense of people, with the poorest of them 
being expected to suffer the most. 
However, according to Guriev and Megginson (2007) many studies of the 
welfare effects of privatization revealed substantial positive benefits, especially 
for lower income groups. Wood (2004) also states that privatization does not 
necessarily negatively affect welfare of the poor, but on the contrary argues that 
the poor can in some cases be the biggest beneficiaries of public utilities’ 
privatization. Wood (2004) provides data on several studies aimed at measuring 
the welfare effect of privatizing utilities in Chile in the late 1980s. Based on the 
findings of those studies Wood (2004) suggests that welfare gain resulting from 
privatization in the context of adequate regulation far outweighs its costs. 
According to Wood (2004) state-run monopolies help reduce inequalities 
because they allow for explicit and implicit cross-subsidies of one category of 
consumers, which is costly to serve, by another. Cross-subsidization of high costs 
of serving rural consumers by urban consumers of electricity provides a good 
illustration for this (Wood, 2004). 
However, in many cases we can see that subsidies in the power sector are 
provided on across-the-table principle, with electricity tariff structures constructed 
in a way to provide the largest benefit to the most politically active and influential 
categories of consumers. It is increasingly argued that problems of income 
distribution and social protection can be efficiently addressed via mechanism of 
targeted subsidies to people in need rather than providing subsidies to the whole 
group of consumers (Bacon & Besant-Jones, 2001). 
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Foreign Ownership 
Boycko, Shleifer and Wishny (1996) argue that divesting SOEs to large 
outside investors is more conducive for efficiency and restructuring. They suggest 
that the reason for that is their interest in profits and not much in preserving 
employment. Due to such difference in their preferences from politicians, such 
investors are harder to bribe through subsidies (Boycko, Shleifer, & Wishny, 
1996). Positive effect of privatization to foreign investors in CIS countries as 
opposed to domestic investors was found in a study the World Bank (Estrin, 
Hanousek, Kocenda, & Svejnar, 2009). Privatization to foreign owners resulted in 
a positive or insignificant effect on total factor productivity, whereas to domestic 
– negative or insignificant effect. 
It is argued that foreign ownership generally positively affects efficiency 
of previously state-owned enterprises. Most of empirical studies indicate a 
positive role of foreign ownership with such firms delivering higher productivity 
improvements (Guriev & Megginson, 2007; Sheshinski & Lopez-Calva, 2003). 
Participation of foreign investors strengthens competitiveness of privatization 
bidding, which maximizes the sale price and helps attract a more efficient owner 
(Guriev & Megginson, 2007). Guriev and Megginson (2007) state that in many 
cases participation of foreign investors was ruled out due to ideological reasons, 
which was observed to cause such negative implications as low privatization 
revenues for governments and inefficient insider ownership, like in Russia, where 
it resulted in the general distrust to the credibility of the reforms.  
2.4.4 Macroeconomic Implications of Privatization 
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By using the proceeds from privatization to decrease public debt 
governments were able to decrease interest payments and provide stronger cash 
flow position of the public sector (Sheshinski & Lopez-Calva, 2003). Privatization 
is said to result in lower interest rates, which are conducive for boosting 
investment, growth and lowering inflation (Sheshinski & Lopez-Calva, 2003). 
Results of the IMF study also suggest that privatization can be conducive to 
economic growth, as was demonstrated by the strong positive correlation between 
privatization and real GDP growth and negative correlation with unemployment 
rate (Davis, Ossowski, Richardson, & Barnett, 2000). 
Results of the study conducted by Estrin et al. (2009) suggest that 
privatization, especially if accompanied by complementary reforms, can have 
positive effect on the level of aggregate output.  
In many countries privatization also leads to development of financial 
markets and increase in stock market capitalization (Sheshinski & Lopez-Calva, 
2003).  
Another positive financial outcome of privatization can be a substantial 
decrease in the amount of subsidies allocated to SOEs. After privatization low 
income countries managed to drastically decrease net subsidies to public 
enterprises on average from 6 per cent to 0.5 per cent of GDP (Sheshinski & 
Lopez-Calva, 2003) 
2.4.5 Important Factors Defining Success of Privatization 
 
Many researchers recognized that privatization, not preceded or 
accompanied by complementary systemic changes and reforms, cannot guarantee 
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positive results for improving performance of SOEs (Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda, 
& Svejnar, 2009). 
Guriev and Megginson (2007) indicate that success of privatization depend 
on many complementary factors such as property rights protection, competition 
and openness, hard budget constraints, low level of corruption, etc. They argue 
(Guriev & Megginson, 2007) that the assessment of effects that privatization 
might have on privatized firms, as well as respective countries’ economies and 
population, will be difficult since it would require making adjustments for the 
complimentary effects of other reforms, which might be a very challenging 
exercise.   
Yarrow (1999) argues that privatization of SOEs can necessitate only a 
minor adjustment of regulatory policy in cases when public monopoly was simply 
replaced by a private monopoly. However, in those cases when privatization is a 
part of a large-scale policy change it can require major bring major changes. It is 
the overall package of regulatory reforms that has most economic importance and 
not privatization alone argues Yarrow (1999).   
In 1995 the World Bank published a report, written to address the problem 
of slow progress with privatization and other public enterprise reforms (Cook & 
Kirkpatrick, 1997). The report examines a set of measures included in packages of 
public enterprise reforms and defining success of those reforms. These are 
measures, introduced in as complementary to mere divestiture of SOEs, such as 
introducing competition policy, imposing hard budget constraints, financial 
reforms and changes in the institutional relationship between public enterprises 
and government (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1997). In the report it is suggested that 
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improving macroeconomic environment and efforts to reduce the opposition to 
reform by public enterprises’ employees and groups depending on the SOE sector 
is a pre-requisite for successful privatization (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1997). The 
report also suggests that the reason for poor progress with privatization reform lies 
in the political obstacles created. In many cases problems and possible solutions 
were revealed long ago, but decisive action was halted for long due to priority 
objectives that had to be tackled by the incumbent governments at that time 
(Bacon & Besant-Jones, 2001). Because there are always people, who are likely to 
suffer from reforms like employees laid off, customers faced with increased tariffs 
or fees, or politicians and bureaucrats who will lose a sphere for patronage; to 
make privatization happen it is needed that some sufficient benefits be provided to 
them to persuade them to support privatization (Bacon & Besant-Jones, 2001).  
2.4.6 Arguments against Privatization 
 
According to Shleifer (1998) privatization may result in new owners’ 
placing too much emphasis on profit maximization, which can be detrimental to 
other socially valuable objectives. He emphasizes (Shleifer, State versus Private 
Ownership, 1998) that for this reason in most developing countries public 
ownership was typical in so-called “strategic” sectors of the economy. Wood 
(2004) suggests that in infrastructure sector profit-seeking organizations are 
unlikely to take the poorest and least advantaged people into consideration when 
developing or repairing infrastructure. Indeed, it would be difficult to expect a 
private companies, for instance, a private electricity distribution company to 
finance construction of an electric line to provide electricity to remote rural areas 
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taking into account the costs and potential economic returns of that for the 
company. 
Yarrow (1999) states that there were many case studies of nationalization, 
when the nationalization was carried out as a pragmatic response to problems, 
encountered by key interest groups in the economy. According to Yarrow (1986), 
government monitoring can potentially be better than private ownership because 
to quote him: “Public ownership provides an instrument for correcting failures 
(inefficiencies) in the markets for goods, factors and corporate control.” 
According to Guriev and Megginson (2007) privatization can lead to 
creation of powerful interest groups, such as large private monopolies, that can 
influence economic policy making. For example, in economies with weak 
institutions it is very likely that private monopolies will exert their influence to 
hinder development of any policies aiming for development of competition 
(Guriev & Megginson, 2007).  
In countries with weak institutions and high level of corruption, rapid- and 
mass privatization schemes can lead to stagnation and decapitalization as 
responsibility to control mediocre assets is given to people, who cannot manage 
them effectively (Wood, 2004). 
In general, privatization is an easy target to attack suggests Wood (2004). 
He (Wood, 2004) explains that since negative results of privatization are so visible 
to the public it is easy to rally support, whereas it is difficult to make the public 
understand the economic counter-arguments. Also people negatively affected by 
privatization usually tend to be more organized and vocal. They try to represent 
own loss as exemplary of an overall loss to society (Wood, 2004). This coupled 
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with their typically being members of previously protected social classes, enables 
them to be relatively effective in protecting own interests by opposing 
privatization (Wood, 2004). 
2.5 Privatization of Public Utilities 
 
Increasing tempo of privatization and liberalization of power sector electric 
utilities observed in the last decade of the twentieth century was triggered by the 
following main forces: high costs, inadequate access to electricity services for 
population and unreliable supply, the inability of state to finance maintenance and 
reconstruction of main assets, the need to withdraw subsidies and opportunities to 
raise funds through divestiture of SOEs (Bacon & Besant-Jones, 2001). 
2.5.1 Implications for Efficiency 
 
According to Wood (2004) public utilities are natural monopolies, which 
requires intervention by the state in their operations in order to provide for the 
overall welfare of society. So in case of privatizing natural monopolies 
governments preserve the ability to intervene by keeping the right to regulate such 
industries   (Wood, 2004). Empirical evidence indicates that the most important 
factor defining success of utilities’ privatization is regulatory policy (Wood, 
2004).   
When it comes to the privatization of natural monopolies the important 
question to be asked by governments is how to deal with the possibility of 
exploitation of market power by private owners by imposing regulatory 
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constraints on private firms without hindering innovation and cost-reduction 
(Sheshinski & Lopez-Calva, 2003). 
Auriol and Blanc (2009) summarize empirical evidence from full and 
partial privatization of electric utilities with the general conclusion testifying to 
the effectiveness of privatization reforms to yield positive implications for 
efficiency. For instance, Auriol and Blanc (2009) describe findings of a study 
providing evidence from privatizing electricity distribution in 116 cases in 10 
Latin American countries indicating that privatization leads to improvements in 
labor productivity, efficiency and quality of service. However, it is mentioned that 
the downside of such drastic improvement is that it came at the expense of 
employment, which was cut by more than 40 per cent (Auriol & Blanc, 2009). 
Another study covering 302 utilities with private sector participation (PSP) and 
928 without PSP found that PSP results in strong impact on the efficiency, raises 
bill collection ratios and improvement in the quality of service (Auriol & Blanc, 
2009). 
2.5.2 Important Factors Requiring Consideration 
 
According to Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (2003) privatization of 
infrastructure
3
 was less effective due to two types of policy mistakes: poor design 
of concessions and inappropriate regulatory activities and tools. However, the 
general conclusion was that privatization of infrastructure yields positive results in 
the form of attained efficiency gains as well as increased volume of investments 
                                                          
3
 Infrastructure sector includes electricity, water distribution, natural gas distribution, telecoms, 
transportation and toll-roads.  
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into infrastructure, given that appropriate regulation was put in place (Sheshinski 
& Lopez-Calva, 2003).  
Auriol and Blanc (2009) state that it is a popular view among consumers in 
developing countries to consider privatization as being detrimental to the welfare 
of the poor, while beneficial for the powerful and wealthy, notably through 
corruption. 
Wood (2004) argues that if privatized utility company substantially 
increases its ability to collect revenue the poor, which previously were able to free 
ride, will bear higher costs. Price increases, which usually follow privatization of 
utilities, will also cause additional financial burden for the poor, but are inevitable 
and even essential for utilities to become self-sufficient (Wood, 2004). At the 
same time Wood (2004) suggests that privatization might in some cases lead to 
curtailing inequality by  necessitating the revision of unfair tariff structures and 
subsidies that often benefitted the better politically connected, usually the urban 
middle class.   
Wood (2004) suggests that taking into account the social sensitivity as 
related to the privatization of utilities, it is crucial for governments, planning to 
undertake privatization, to make the best effort to take into consideration the 
interests of the poor. This is required because, if there is a perception that 
privatization was detrimental to the overall welfare, the political implications 
might be devastating (Wood, 2004). 
It is again emphasized that in order for the privatization to succeed, the 
public should recognize the credibility of privatization and perceive it as 
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beneficial for them, which in turn would require the introduction of a well 
thought-out regulatory framework (Wood, 2004). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Analytical Framework 
3.1 Research questions 
 
1. How do corruption and other rent-seeking activities in the power sector 
affect efficiency and profitability of power sector enterprises? 
2. Why is privatization of power distribution companies likely to bring 
about improvement in efficiency and growth?   
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
The research method chosen for conducting this research is Qualitative 
Case Study Method. Merriam (1998) argues that the case study provides rich and 
holistic view of real-life research problems. Therefore, this research method 
enables to reach an in-depth understanding of the complex issue of the state-
owned electric utility companies’ inefficiency and factors causing it in the 
intricate political economy context of the Kyrgyz Republic.  
According to Merriam (1998) qualitative research design is chosen when 
researchers are interested in insight, discovery, and interpretation and not in 
hypothesis testing. Merriam (1998) argues that Case Study method has 
particularistic, descriptive and heuristic features, which are of special importance 
for defining conditions of its applicability. Particularistic feature means that case 
study focuses on particular phenomenon, situation, event or program making it a 
good choice for researching practical problems. Descriptive feature provides for 
comprehensive, rich description of researched issue and cover consideration of as 
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many variables affecting the issue as possible. Heuristic feature is related to 
ability of a researcher to reach deep understanding of the phenomenon leading to 
confirmation of previously known and discovery of new aspects of the research 
subject.   
According to Merriam (1998) case study as opposed to other types of 
qualitative research does not require usage of any particular method of data 
collection and analysis. In conducting the research the author relies on data 
collected from variety of secondary data sources, described in the next section. 
The author’s three years working experience as a policy maker with 
responsibilities for monitoring of the electric energy distribution companies also 
contributed to the conduct of the research.    
3.3 Sources of Data 
 
The research was conducted on the basis of secondary data from multitude 
of sources, including: 
- laws and regulations of the Kyrgyz Republic; 
- officially published statistical data of National Bank of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, the National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, etc. 
- power sector enterprises’ financial and operational performance data 
for years 2010 and 2011. Provided by the MEIKR in electronic spreadsheet 
format;  
- reports by international financial and development organizations such 
as the World Bank, the IMF, the UNDP, various NGOs, consulting companies, 
etc.; 
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- books, academic journals, newspapers, internet websites. 
- empirical evidence on the experience of privatizing SOEs and 
especially public utility companies’ in developing and transition countries. 
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Chapter 4: Presentation of Materials   
4.1 Performance of the Power Distribution Sector 
 
Inefficiency pervaded the power sector of Kyrgyzstan. Companies of the power 
sector, owned and managed by the state, have been delivering consistently poor 
performance since unbundling of the vertically integrated monopoly took place in 
2001. The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic in 2008 enacted a decree, which 
approved the National Energy Program of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2008-2010 and 
the Development of the Fuel Energy Complex to 2025. The program listed the 
following as main problems of the power sector: poor operating and financial 
management; high technical and commercial losses of power resulting from high 
rate of wear and electric energy pilfering; poor bill payment discipline by 
consumers; inadequate financing of equipment reconstruction, etc. (Government 
of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2008).  
Deeper insight into problems of the power distribution sector will be 
provided below.  
4.1.1 Managerial and Operational Problems 
 
In 2010 in response to the request by the Ministry of Energy of the Kyrgyz 
Republic (currently MEIKR) consulting company, TetraTech Es, Inc., was 
commissioned by the USAID to conduct management diagnostic study of major 
energy companies (TetraTech Es, Inc., 2011). The diagnostic was aimed at 
identifying ways of improving governance and performance of each company to 
achieve higher efficiency and self-sustainability of the power sector. The first 
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phase of the diagnostic was conducted from November 2010 to March 2011 and 
was based primarily on interviews with senior and mid-level managers of the 
companies, and the MEIKR staff. As stated in the consultancy firm’s report, the 
first phase of the diagnostic exercise was expected to provide quick identification 
of the most evident weaknesses and highest priority opportunities for significant 
improvements in the management practices and operations of the companies 
(TetraTech Es, Inc., 2011). As a result of the diagnostic review of the PDCs the 
consultant defined the following key problem areas (TetraTech Es, Inc., 2011, p. 
1):  
1. Insufficient control over electricity flow: metering equipment and 
verification procedures cannot provide accurate recording of energy flows 
between generation, transmission and distribution companies  
2. Evident exaggeration of reported technical losses, which is likely to be an 
attempt to deliberately misrepresent commercial losses as technical. 
3. The existing regulatory framework and business planning practices allow, 
condone, and make customers pay for high level of losses. 
4. The existing practice of meter reading, billing, disconnection and collection 
of payments does not permit to provide accurate reporting of electricity 
delivered versus amounts collected.  
5. Organizational structures are designed in such a way that roles and 
responsibilities are diluted, thus making it very difficult to hold specific 
individuals or organizational units accountable for performance.  
6. There is evidence of high numbers of unregistered as well as unmetered 
customers. Furthermore, the network and customer databases are outdated. 
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This environment allows substantial amounts of electricity to be unaccounted 
for, thus contributing to the high rate of losses. 
7. There are insufficient capabilities in loss prevention, loss detection and loss 
recovery practices throughout the electricity distribution sector. Business 
processes are weak because specialists are not trained or equipped adequately.  
8. In several regions around the country, payments for consumed electricity 
are still collected in cash by hand. This practice provides the possibility for 
illicit activities. 
9. Financial budgeting as well as the internal financial audit function has a 
formal character as opposed to being used as a serious means of healthy 
business planning and ensuring prudent compliance. 
10. Remuneration and reward systems throughout the sector are designed in a 
way that provokes and enables illicit activities as opposed to encouraging 
employees to work with integrity and motivation. 
11. There is weak control over procurement practices. Although the 
companies demonstrate some degree of formal transparency in this process, 
there is evidence that some steps are taken to deny certain vendors from 
participating in a truly competitive bidding process. 
12. Materials and inventory control systems need substantial strengthening. 
There is clear evidence that materials in warehouses are not being tracked 
properly.  
13. There is little evidence of a shared understanding across the distribution 
sector about the strategy and implementation of the reforms that are necessary 
to achieve self-sustaining operations. 
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14. There are 16 so-called enclaves or small licensees. These are very small 
companies that own (or lease) very limited assets (sometimes only one 
transformer) and over the years have been put in an advantageous position to 
supply the best paying customers. This deprives the main distribution 
companies of substantial revenues
4
.  
Having interviewed many employees of the power sector companies the 
consultant have found that none of the companies had developed corporate 
strategies, which would be in line with and conform to the sectorial development 
strategy devised by the MEIKR; that most top managers were unable to formulate 
their vision of their company’s strategy for achieving self-sustainability; that most 
employees lack initiative and motivation to undertake any efforts to contribute to 
improving performance preferring to limit themselves to doing just enough to 
keep their current positions (TetraTech Es, Inc., 2011). 
4.1.2 Tariffs and Cost-recovery 
 
It is important to note that during Soviet times Kyrgyzstan had robust 
industrialized economy and power sector’s output was mainly consumed by 
industrial enterprises with population accounting for only small share of the total 
energy consumption. Economic recession, resulting from the Soviet Union’s 
collapse, led to dramatic drop in industrial activity and falling demand for electric 
energy. It is worth mentioning that since 1991 the consumption of industrial 
consumers has shrank by 2.8 times and agricultural by 3.6 times (Hasanov, et al., 
                                                          
4
 Shortened by the author 
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2011). The power sector suddenly found itself with huge excess of power 
generation capacity. 
After the independence taking into account low direct costs of using 
hydropower for energy production and the population’s low standards of living, 
the government started promoting electric power as cheap substitute to more 
expensive imported oil products and coal. 
According to the Act of the Kyrgyz Republic “On the power industry” tariffs 
in the power sector should not only provide for the full recovery of costs, but also 
certain profit margin in order to attract investments to the sector (Jogorku Kenesh 
Source: Kyrgyzstan: Power Generation and Transmission, Zozulinsky (2010) 
Figure 9: Comparison of Tariffs by Country (2006 tariffs) 
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of the Kyrgyz Republic, 1997). The same act prohibits cross-subsidization 
between different categories of customers. 
Figure 9 provides comparison of electricity tariffs in Kyrgyzstan with tariffs 
in other post-soviet countries, Eastern Europe and Turkey. 
Yet the reality contradicts with both of the specified provisions of the law. 
Electricity tariffs in Kyrgyzstan (approximately 1.5 US cents per 1 kWh for 
residential consumers, 2,75 US cents – for commercial consumers) are constantly 
fixed rate tariffs, which are low by international standards and do not cover the 
cost of production (Zozulinsky, 2010). Current electricity tariffs for residential 
consumers are among the lowest in region. After the tariffs for residential users 
were more than doubled in early 2010 the electricity tariffs were reverted back to 
the old original level by the post-revolutionary Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic. Please see Table 2 for preceding tariff raise, after raise and current 
electricity tariffs policy
5
. 
Tariffs for electric power and heat energy are pulled in opposite direction by 
                                                          
5
 UNDP experts used exchange rate of 1 USD = 43.8 Kyrgyz soms  
Source: Energy and Communal Services in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: A 
Poverty and Social Impact Assessment, Slay B. 2011 
Table 2: Electricity Tariffs from 2009 - present day 
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social acceptability and economic feasibility (Hasanov & Izmailov, Chapter 3: 
Kyrgyzstan's Power Sector, 2011). However, it is clear that current tariff policy is 
skewed much more in the direction of social policy. Low tariffs for residential 
consumers are subsidized by higher tariffs charged to other categories of 
consumers, e.g. commercial and industrial consumers; and revenue generated by 
exporting power to neighboring countries. However, the broad category of 
residential consumers obviously includes not only the poor and vulnerable 
households, but also more affluent people, who do not need any support from the 
state. Taking into account the straight-line rate electricity tariffs in Kyrgyzstan, 
not changing with the increase in the amount of power consumed, it is ironically 
so, that since more affluent people have higher living standards, they are likely to 
consume more power per capita and correspondingly benefit from subsidies more 
than poorer citizens (Izmailov, Karataeva, Mateev, Sultankulova, & Shigaibaeva, 
2007). This is one of the most evident lapses in the effective tariffs policy. 
Gradual deterioration of the power sector has long been ignored by the state. 
The policy of promoting use of electric energy as a substitute to other types of fuel 
was short-sighted for several reasons. First, it did not take into account limited 
transmission capacity and poor technical condition of the existing power 
distribution networks. Increased load of the equipment, especially during cold 
season, results in a large number of failures due to capacity overload and 
equipment breakdown. Second, low socially oriented tariffs covered only direct 
costs of production without realistic consideration of capital investments that 
would be needed for renewal of technical infrastructure. Inability to finance the 
reconstruction of quickly deteriorating technical infrastructure only leads to 
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further aggravation of the problem. Third, such policies helped to create the 
widespread belief about electric energy as of a very cheap and abundant good. As 
a result, many people seem to treat it as almost like ‘manna falling from heaven’, 
or type of goods costing next to nothing to produce. Such erroneous perception, 
shared by significant share of the Kyrgyz society, is likely to create difficulties for 
realization of any future initiatives by the Government to raise the households 
tariff in an attempt of bringing it closer to full cost recovery level. 
According to the report by a consultancy firm, hired by USAID to carry out 
the analysis of power sector companies’ operations, the prime cost of providing 
electric supply services at given unreliable quality level equals 0.99 Kyrgyz soms
6
 
(2.2 US cents) per 1 kWh, while prime cost, which would be adequate for 
provision of reliable and stable services throughout the year, was estimated to be 
                                                          
6
 Kyrgyz som is the national currency of the Kyrgyz Republic 
Source: TetraTech Es Inc., Review of the Prime Cost of Electricity, 2011 (note: exchange rate used 1 USD = 46.0 som) 
Table 3: Preliminary Estimates of the Prime Cost of Electricity 
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around 2 soms (4.4 US cents) per 1 kWh (please see Table 3 below). Consultants 
calculated that such improvement of quality of service would be possible, if 
revenue of the power sector more than doubles, jumping from 190 million US 
dollars for current level to 415 million for the alternative improved services 
scenario (TetraTech Es, Inc., 2011).  
The consultants rated current level of electric power supply in Kyrgyzstan as 
“unreliable” taking into consideration 12,578 power outages per year in 2010 or 
34 per day (TetraTech Es, Inc., 2011). They argue: “… the attempt to continue 
operating the sector at this level of revenue under current management practices 
will result in a daily hardship and costs on the population, businesses and industry 
of the Kyrgyz Republic” (TetraTech Es, Inc., 2011). If present practices are to be 
continued, the overall energy security of the country will be at risk considering 
probability of a catastrophic breakdown (TetraTech Es, Inc., 2011).  
Thus, low electricity tariffs in Kyrgyzstan is one of the major constraints for 
increasing revenues of the sector, which in its turn would allow increasing 
investments into technical infrastructure development. On the other hand, raising 
tariffs can be a double-edged sword (Slay, 2011). Without (i) improved 
management practices (particularly to reduce theft and losses); (ii) credible threat 
of disconnection for non-payment; (iii) effective public communications 
concerning the need for higher tariffs; and (iv) households’ willingness to pay 
higher tariffs, energy tariff hikes can be ineffective or worse (Slay, 2011). 
It is evident that current tariffs policy provides power companies with very 
modest profitability potential and is mostly socially orientated to provide political 
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stability in politically turbulent years after the revolution of 2010 (Hasanov, et al., 
2011). 
4.1.2 Losses of Electric Power 
 
High system losses of power have long been one of the most devastating scourges 
of the Kyrgyzstani power distribution sector. For example, in 2007 total losses in 
the distribution sector equaled enormous 36.2 per cent of the total volume of 
energy inflow to networks of distribution companies.  
Power losses include two components: technical and non-technical 
(commercial) losses. It is somewhat straightforward that technical losses stem 
from natural physical processes of electricity transportation and depend on quality 
of equipment used. As for commercial losses, these are losses, representing the 
Source: World Bank data  
Figure 10: Electric Power Transmission and Distribution Losses (% of output) 
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difference between volume of electricity actually provided to consumers and the 
volume, for which customers were charged for.  
In recent years, as a result of the Government’s pressure to improve 
efficiency in the power sector, overall losses in the distribution sector have been 
substantially reduced. Losses in generation and transmission sectors as percentage 
of total output were relatively stable in 2010 and 2011 and equaled 0.4 per cent 
and about 5.2 per cent respectively. Overall losses in distribution in 2010 
accounted for 26.8 per cent and 22.3 per cent in 2011. However, overall losses in 
transmission and distribution in Kyrgyzstan (2009 – 30 %, 2011 – 28 %) remain 
very high compared to other developing countries in Europe and Central Asia (11 
– 14 %), and especially to the world average (7 – 10 %). See Figure 10 for details.  
For details on system losses of electric energy in the distribution sector for 
the period of 2009 – 2011 please see Figure 11. 
Technical Losses 
 Inefficiency problems stemming from technical aspects of regional power 
distribution companies’ (PDCs) operations are common for all four companies. 
High technical losses are being justified by poor condition of equipment, which, 
reportedly, is a result of high level of technical wear and tear and lack of 
investments into development of technical infrastructure. The rate of wear in 
distribution network, which was mostly constructed about 30-40 years ago, is 
threateningly high for provision of the energy security. Rate of wear in 
“Severelectro” is assessed to be around 35,3 per cent, in “Vostokelektro” – 47,7 
per cent, “Oshelektro” – 52,8 per cent and “Jalalabatelectro” – 53,4 per cent 
(Hasanov, et al., 2011). 
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 Figure 11 reveals that in the period of 2009 to 2011 there was no reduction 
in technical losses. In fact, technical losses either rose or remained on about the 
same level like in “Vostokelektro”. Especially noticeable was growth of the 
technical losses for two consecutive years in “Severelectro”.  
 Poor technical condition of main equipment not only leads to high technical 
losses, but also greatly reduces reliability of power supply resulting in increased 
number of blackouts and unstable voltage. Power consumption has been steadily 
growing recently, which, especially during cold season, causes overloads, leading 
to emergency outages and mass damages to distribution networks.  
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Source: 2010 and 2011 figures from MEIKR, 2009 figures from Hasanov et al. (2011) 
Figure 11: Losses of Power Distribution Companies (2009 - 2011), % 
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According to Tallapragada et al. (2009) number of outages per year is the 
main indicator of service quality from customer perspective. High number of 
outages registered in the power system of KR annually is an indication of low 
quality of power supply. Another aspect of service quality, not paid enough 
attention by the MEIKR and power companies, is voltage, which often is lower 
than specified standard of 220 volts. According to the MEIKR in 2011 about 90 
per cent of consumers got power at lower than standard voltage, which might 
cause damage to their property (home appliances, equipment, etc.). Figure 12 
illustrates the trend of increasing number of power outages in recent years, which 
can be attributed to overall deterioration of the PDCs’ technical infrastructure. 
The peak number of outages in 2008 can be attributed to the impact of 
Source: Root Causes and Symptoms of the Kyrgyz Republic's Power Sector's Poor Condition 
(Hasanov, et al., 2011) 
Figure 12: Emergency Outages in the Distribution Sector 
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anomalously cold winter and greatly increased consumption for heating purposes, 
which caused massive overloads and outages in distribution networks. 
Neither power companies, nor the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic were 
successful in raising funds necessary for modernizing energy generation, 
transmission, and distribution facilities and bringing them to conditions, which 
would be adequate for ensuring energetic security of Kyrgyzstan. The situation, as 
has already been stated, is aggravated by effective tariff levels and regulatory 
legal base. 
Commercial Losses 
At certain stage in the past the Government made decision to introduce the 
concept of “commercial losses”. This step was made to create a credible basis to 
be used by power distribution companies to account for losses, resulting from 
unauthorized use/pilferage of electricity. At the same time, by doing so the 
Government created additional opportunity for rent-seeking activities in the 
sector, which currently has the reputation of being deeply permeated by 
corruption and rent-seeking.   
 Commercial losses still account for significant share of overall losses of 
energy, despite good results in their reduction achieved in recent years. 
Commercial losses showed sharp decrease from 2010 to 2011 for PDCs as a 
whole. Except for “Vostokelektro”, which reported huge increase in commercial 
losses in 2010 with sharp reduction in 2011, commercial losses in the other three 
companies decreased. “Oshelektro” and “Djalalabatelektro” reported huge 
reduction in commercial losses in 2011 from 8.3 to 2.4 and from 11.1 to 1.0 per 
cent respectively. 
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  It can be seen from the Figure 11 above that reported technical losses 
considerably exceed commercial losses. Experts argue that such high technical 
losses are unlikely to be true, even considering current poor condition of 
distribution networks (Hasanov, et al., 2011). They suggest that distribution 
companies are likely to report certain share of commercial losses as technical.  It 
might be because reduction of commercial losses was given higher priority by 
controlling government bodies, implying more responsibility for PDCs’ managers 
for reducing commercial losses than technical (Hasanov, et al., 2011).  
Hasanov et al. (2011) describes results of internal inspections of PDCs, 
which revealed many violations in the period from 2003 to 2010. The violations 
included making artificial customer records in the billing system not backed by 
service contracts. It was done in order to decrease reported losses and inflate sales. 
In “Severelectro” in the period from 2003 to April 2010 such manipulations 
amounted to the total of 473.7 million kWhs   
Hasanov et al. (2011) suggest that another reason for high commercial 
losses is inaccurate customer databases and unsatisfactory efforts of sales and 
billing departments’ staff.  
4.1.3 Financial Results 
 
Power distribution companies have been delivering poor financial performance 
since unbundling of “Kyrgyzenergo”. Figure 13 below illustrates overall trend of 
the power sector enterprises’ profitability in recent years. 
Low tariffs, high losses and inability to provide full collection of tariff are 
main causes of the power distribution companies’ lackluster financial results. The 
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gap between accounts payable, which are the result of failure to provide complete 
collection of tariff, and accounts receivable keeps increasing ever since the former 
exceeded the latter in 2003. Continuation of this trend lowers liquidity of power 
sector enterprises and threatens overall financial stability of the sector. 
  Representatives of power sector companies tend to emphasize low tariffs 
as the primary cause of poor financial situation. Yet experts have a different 
opinion, arguing that poor financial performance and losses of the distribution 
power companies were the result of many factors besides low tariffs, including 
ineffective management, embezzlement, pilferage of electricity, etc.  (Hasanov, et 
al., 2011). 
 According to the MEIKR data in 2010 all PDCs showed losses with the 
aggregate losses equaling 205 million soms. In 2011 three companies 
“Oshelektro”, “Vostokelektro” and “Djalalabatelektro” substantially improved 
financial performance and reported profits. Such dramatic change can be partially 
explained by meaningful decrease of losses. However, the largest PDC 
“Severelectro” reported much worse results with losses of 173.8 million soms. For 
more details on PDCs’ 2010 – 2011 profitability performance please see 
Appendix 3. 
Collection of Payments 
Incomplete collection of payments poses a significant threat for financial stability 
of the power sector and the sector’s future development prospects. The chain 
starts with some customers not paying for electricity. Distribution companies’ 
inability to collect service fees to the full extent adversely affects their financial 
performance and creates problems with timely settlement of distribution 
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companies’ credit and tax obligations before the state budget (Slay, 2011). 
However, it also dramatically affects their partner companies, including the 
upstream generation and transmission company. Poor collection leads to 
accumulation of massive accounts payable and accounts receivable and weakens 
cash flow of not only PDCs, but also generation and transmission companies.  
Table 4 below illustrates the results of payment collection for the period 
2009 – 2011. It can be seen that collection of payments is unsatisfactorily low. 
The aggregate collection ratio for all PDCs in 2010 equaled to 90.7 per cent and in 
2011 to 93.6 per cent. Based on this we can conclude that in general PDCs 
managed to improve their collection in the specified period. At the same time, it 
can be seen that every regional PDC has its problematic customer groups, where 
collection level is very low compared to other PDCs. For example, “Severelectro” 
Source: Root Causes and Symptoms of the Kyrgyz Republic's Power Sector's Poor Condition, 
Hasanov et al. (2011), Soros Foundation Kyrgyzstan 
Figure 13: Aggregate Profitability of the Power Sector Companies, (mln. soms) 
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has unacceptably low collection ratio for its industrial category of consumers, 
which was below 60 per cent both in 2010 and 2011, for “Vostokelektro” - 
agricultural consumers with collection of 46 per cent in 2010 and horrible 17 per 
cent in 2011. “Oshelektro” has a very low collection rate from agricultural 
consumers as well, equaling to 57 per cent in 2010 and 70 per cent in 2011. For 
“Djalalabatelektro” the most problematic is the households’ category with the 
collection rate of 68 per cent in 2010 and 86 per cent in 2011. It should be noted 
that providing high collection rates for households is problematic for all PDCs. 
But achieving good payment collection in this category is very important, because 
households consume about 60 per cent of the whole domestically distributed 
volume of energy. As indicated by the data in Table 4 below, in 2011 all PDC 
managed to yield positive results in improving households’ collection rate.  
From Table 4 we can see that incomplete collection of payments can 
COLLECTION RATIOS
2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011
OVERALL 
COLLECTION,               
as % of sales
% 94.5% 98.0% 88.8% 86.5% 86.3% 90.8% 83.5% 90.1% 90.7% 93.6%
Industrial % 58.8% 58.0% 98.7% 92.0% 105.3% 100.3% 100.9% 97.4%
Government Institutions % 105.1% 97.0% 98.1% 102.3% 112.1% 112.9% 95.7% 85.7%
Agricultural % 106.4% 114.0% 46.2% 16.6% 57.8% 70.5% 218.6% 159.3%
Households % 89.4% 95.0% 82.7% 91.9% 81.1% 85.7% 67.7% 86.1% 84.0% 91.3%
Other consumers % 129.8% 136.0% 85.1% 83.4% 65.3% 80.0% 84.6% 90.9%
Expected Increase in in 
Accounts Receivable 
(Sales less Collection)
thous.som 192,710 93,302 100,878 138,987 166,230 126,098 139,918 94,224 599,736 452,611
Severelectro Vostokelectro Oshelectro Djalalabatelectro PDCs Total
Source: The MEIKR calculations (data provided in spreadsheets) 
Table 4: PDCs' Payment Collection Ratios (2010 - 2011) 
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accumulate to big amounts, representing the increase in PDCs’ accounts 
receivable. In 2010 the difference between sales and collection volume, which 
would be expected to cause an increase in accounts receivable, equaled to 599.7 
million soms, which is about 12.4 million USD
7
, and in 2011 to 452.6 million 
soms or 9.35 million USD. 
Hasanov et al. (2011) argue that one of the main causes for poor payment 
discipline of population is their attitude towards electric power. Many consumers 
still do not perceive electric power as a commodity requiring payment for the right 
to use it like other goods, such as, for example, food or gasoline (Hasanov, et al., 
2011). Therefore, they are likely to put the payment off until other more urgent 
obligations are taken care of. Experts also blame PDCs staff for their inability or 
unwillingness to make best efforts to provide for the timely payment of the bills, 
to take timely actions to cut-off not- paying customers and effectively claim the 
debts via court trials (Hasanov, et al., 2011). 
Disconnection for non-payment is an important mechanism for improving 
collection of payments (Tallapragada et al., 2009). In this regard, it has to be 
noted that the PDCs’ ability to use disconnections of non-payer customers 
(including debtor government entities) from the grid as a disciplinary measure is 
seriously hampered by resistance to it by government entities, local 
municipalities, law enforcement agencies and other politically influential groups 
(TetraTech Es, Inc., 2011). Example of “Vostokelektro” can be used for 
illustrating this effect. As of December 2010 56.4 per cent of “Vostokelektro” 
                                                          
7
 Official National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic exchange rate as of June 13, 2014 - 1 USD = 48.42 
Kyrgyz soms 
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customers had debts, but only 2 per cent of debtors were disconnected (TetraTech 
Es, Inc., 2011). Such interference on part of the abovementioned parties seriously 
affects efficiency of tariff collection; hence financial performance of the PDCs 
deteriorates. 
It is important to note that in Kyrgyz energy system companies, representing 
different functional stages like generation, transmission and distribution, do not 
pay each other directly. According to the existing payment collection and 
distribution mechanism regional power distribution companies are not directly 
responsible for collecting and managing cash payments. After PDCs’ issue 
invoices to end users the latter can pay for power at banks, post offices, etc. 
Collected payments are eventually transferred to escrow accounts opened in  
major state bank and divided among the companies by percentage shares set 
monthly by the “Regulator” (Hasanov & Izmailov, Chapter 3: Kyrgyzstan's Power 
Sector, 2011). Under this scheme of financial settlements PDCs seem to, in a way, 
borrow electricity from the generation company and services of transportation 
from the transmission company with the promise to pay when customers pay 
them. This effectively means that the generation and transmission companies 
share the risk of not getting paid on time and in full, and are totally dependent on 
the PDCs effectiveness in ensuring timely and complete collection of tariff. As 
can be seen, proportions of cash allocation among power sector enterprises, 
defined by the “Regulator”, have immense importance in providing the 
companies’ cash flow positions. 
Accounts Receivable and Accounts Payable 
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Poor collection of electricity tariff is the reason, leading to building up of PDCs 
massive accounts receivable and accounts payable. According to the MEIKR by 
the end of 2009 PDCs accumulated accounts receivable in the amount of 2,379 
million soms. Households share was 1684 million or almost 71 per cent of the 
total. At the same time PDCs owed 3,700 million to the generation and 1,638 
million soms to the transmission companies. We can see that accounts payable 
substantially exceed accounts receivable in the total amount. For details on PDCs’ 
accounts receivable and payables please see Appendix 4. 
In the beginning of 2010, soon after the controversial privatization of 
“Severelektro” and “Vostokelektro”, the Act # 16 of Jan. 28th, 2010 (Jogorku 
Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2010) was enacted ostensibly with the goal of 
stabilizing and supporting financial standing of power sector companies by 
writing off bad debts. Following adoption of the act, a total of 1,760 million soms 
were written off from PDCs’ accounts receivable as bad debts. But even more 
impressing 2,053.6 and 451.3 million soms were written off from accounts 
payable to the generation and transmission companies respectively. Experts argue 
that the Government’s acceptance of regularly writing off significant shares of the 
PDCs’ accounts receivable and accounts payable not only negatively affects the 
generation and transmission companies, but also significantly weakens incentives 
of power companies’ managers to exert more efforts to improving the tariff 
collection rate (Hasanov, et al., 2011).  
In 2010 and 2011 both accounts receivable and accounts payable continued 
to grow. Based on the MEIKR data, provided in Appendix 4, we can calculate that 
after deduction the amount written off in accordance with the Act in 2010 
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accounts receivable increased by 560.4 million soms and in 2011 by 315.5 million 
(PDCs’ reports based). Looking at the table in Appendix 5, it becomes clear that 
as expected increases in accounts payable were the result of low tariff payment 
discipline of population. Actually calculations of the expected increase in 
accounts receivable, based only on collection rate, provide for even more 
impressive increases equaling to 599.7 million in 2010 and 452.6 million soms in 
2011.  
As we saw increasing accounts payable lead to increase in accounts payable 
to generation and transmission companies. However, we can also see that scale of 
effect that PDCs’ increasing accounts receivable (AR) had for increasing their 
accounts payable (AP) to the generation and transmission company in 2010 and 
2011 was not constant. For instance, in 2010 when AR increased by 560.4 million 
soms AP to the generation company increased by 112.6 million USD, which 
equals to 20 per cent of the increase in AR. In 2011 the AR rose by 315.5 million 
soms, AP rose by almost 46 million or 14.5 per cent of the increase in AR. 
However, for the transmission company interrelation with the PDC’s AR increase 
is different. In 2010 the PDCs accounts payable even decreased by 10.4 million 
soms, despite meaningful increase in AR, and in 2011 AP increased by 84.4 
million soms, which equals to staggering 27 per cent of the PDC’s 315.5 million 
soms AR increase. Such controversial results can probably be explained by the 
“Regulator’s” making drastic changes in proportions of tariff payment funds, 
which are collected and accumulated in escrow accounts, allocated to the 
transmission company.  If this is true, then this example would illustrate that the 
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“Regulator” has significant regulatory power, enabling it to influence the financial 
condition of power sector enterprises. 
At the same time it is evident that most of the PDC’s accounts payable to 
the generation and transmission companies cannot be paid out of accounts 
receivable, since the former usually exceed the latter. At the end of 2011 PDCs 
had 1495 million soms of accounts receivables, which corresponded to 2,857 
million soms of accounts payable to the firms mentioned above. Looking at the 
whole picture, we can conclude that it is probably inevitable that in near future 
some writing off will be needed again. 
Table 5 below shows accounts receivable in days calculated for the 
Kyrgyzstani PDCs. As we can see there is significant difference in the days of 
sales outstanding between PDCs. The best performance is provided by 
“Severelectro” with only 22.9 days in 2010 and 28 in 2011, while the worst by 
“Oshelektro” with correspondingly 147.3 and 165.8 days. These DSO figures will 
be compared to indicators of electric utility companies in countries of Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), many of which are low income countries like Kyrgyzstan. 
This comparison is provided just to give us the general idea on comparative 
performance of Kyrgyzstani companies. According to Tallapragada et al. (2009) 
2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011
DSO days 22.9 28.0 112.8 103.1 147.3 165.8 82.0 110.9 66.5 76.7
Severelectro Vostokelectro Oshelectro Djalalabatelectro PDCs Total
Table 5: Accounts Receivable in Days (DSO, days) 
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the best performers among SSA countries in 2004 – 2006 had DSO below 60 
days, mean was 117 days and median figure equaled 75 days. We can see that 
DSO of the whole distribution sector in Kyrgyzstan with 66.5 in 2010 and 76.7 in 
2011 is worse than the best SSA countries’. At the same time, we should not 
forget that DSO results in 2010 were calculated using accounts receivable figures 
after the massive writing-off took place in the beginning of the year, meaning that 
results would be much worse had it not happened. This probably is sufficient for 
drawing a conclusion that PDCs’ financial performance can be defined as 
inefficient.  
In must be reiterated that inability of PDCs to repay the debt to the 
“upstream” companies, caused by poor collection of electricity tariff, greatly 
weakens their financial position. This in its turn does not allow them to repay their 
obligations on foreign credits and before the state budget, not even mentioning 
necessity to make capital investments needed to replace worn-out and outdated 
equipment.  
4.2 Rent-seeking in the Power Sector 
4.2.1 Distribution of Political Power in Kyrgyzstan 
 
As was mentioned earlier distribution of political power in an economy is 
the main factor defining who will win and lose in distribution contest (Khan, 
2000).  
Engvall in his study conducted in July 2011, a year after the revolution of 
2010, characterizes political power in Kyrgyzstan as a battle between clans 
headed by strong political personalities (Engvall, 2011). It is suggested that elites 
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compete through informal patron-client pyramid networks, which are based 
mostly on kinship, friendship and mercantilistic considerations. It can be argued 
that origins of such political structure with many clan-based patron-client 
networks competing for power are rooted in the pre-Soviet history of the Kyrgyz 
people (Engvall, 2011). Before Soviet Union the Kyrgyz were represented by a 
big number of independent tribes each governed by its own chief, who was 
responsible for settling disputes among his tribesmen and regulating judicial and 
territorial issues with rival tribes. Despite Soviet Union’s attempts to loosen tribal 
and kinship system, old identities were not completely erased (Engvall, 2011).  
Engvall (2011) emphasizes the overwhelming importance of greed as the 
primary driving force for competing political factions, while ideology and other 
motives are presented as having much less priority. Three factors are highlighted 
as defining the balance of political power in Kyrgyzstan (Engvall, 2011). First one 
is defined by proximity to ruling elite, which guarantees better protection of 
property rights as compared with the judicial system as long as agents maintain 
close relationships with patrons. Second, the system is based on controlling rents 
and requires close connections between political and business worlds. As stated 
by Engvall (2011) state is itself a vehicle for earning meaningful social status and 
material wealth. Third, the state is organized as a marketplace with the following 
arguments provided by Engvall (2011) as support to this statement. 
Administrative and political posts are considered as investments with bribes 
serving as return on investments. Due to volatile political situation, incumbent 
holders of lucrative positions cannot be sure of the duration of own tenure and 
therefore try to maximize return on investment in the shortest time possible. In its 
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turn, salability of positions in public service inevitably causes decline in the 
quality of governance. The population’s access to public goods, which effectively 
become private under these settings, is severely restricted. Finally, Engvall (2011) 
argues that economic growth and state treasury suffer from the outflow of funds, 
which could potentially be channeled into productive activities, into the patron-
client networks.  
Before the revolution of 2010 the former President, Kurmanbek Bakiev, 
and his family members succeeded in establishing almost totally authoritarian 
political and economic control, which caused widespread unrest finally leading to 
the events of April 2010. After the revolution the interim government tried to 
prevent the repetition of scenario, in which it was possible for a small group of 
people to usurp total power, by adopting a new Constitution that provides for 
significant curtailing of the President’s functions with simultaneous strengthening 
of the Parliament’s role (Djuraev, 2012). For instance, in accordance with the new 
Constitution, the President lost the right to appoint and dismiss ministers, heads of 
local governments, to influence domestic economic policy, etc. (Djuraev, 2012). 
The new Constitution also stipulates that no political party can get more than 65 
seats in the 120-seat parliament, and requires formation of a coalition to amass the 
majority, if there is no single party with majority control. 
Parliamentary elections held in October of 2011 resulted in five parties’ 
getting seats in the Parliament in proportions requiring not less than three of those 
to form a coalition (Djuraev, 2012). Although in the beginning of the Parliament’s 
operation there were some difficulties experienced in finding a consensus between 
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members of a ruling coalition, whose composition changed a couple of times, the 
Parliament seems to be capable of functioning under the new mode.  
Based on the relatively smooth functioning of the new political order, 
Djuraev (2012) concludes that eradication of the monopoly over political power 
was successful and suggests that the new political system can be sustained. 
According to Djuraev (2012), several factors have important influence on the 
division of power under current arrangement. These factors are social and political 
fragmentation and the interests of predatory political and business elites. In 
Kyrgyzstan political fragmentation is based on strong connections between 
political leaders and their local constituencies (Djuraev, 2012). He states (Djuraev, 
2012) that political and business elites maintain close clientelistic relationships 
with particular localities (often their hometowns as well as electoral districts). 
Another dimension of political fragmentation emphasized by Djuraev (2012) is 
regional. This is demonstrated by difference in the number of votes each political 
party won in different regions. Some parties were dominant in southern regions, 
while other parties in northern; some demonstrated better results in urban areas as 
compared to rural, etc.  
Djuraev’s (2012) definition of the political and business elites as predatory 
is based upon the argument that these elites consider the state as a source for 
extracting personal gains. The state is described as an investment market, allowing 
for purchase and sale of certain potentially lucrative government posts (Djuraev, 
2012).  
It is suggested that revolutions of 2005 and 2010 happened because of 
successful efforts of former Presidents’ Akaev and Bakiev to create single 
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dominant pro-presidential parties, thus limiting access to “state resources” for 
other powerful political players (Djuraev, 2012). Djuraev (2012) argues that the 
new mode of multiparty parliament and coalition government can be sustained as, 
in this context, it can provide certain level of access to public resources to many 
political elite groups, thus allowing for balance to be maintained.  
On the whole, the author strongly agrees that definition of contemporary 
political system of Kyrgyzstan provided by Djuraev (2012) using Carothers’ term 
“feckless pluralism” accurately reflects today’s reality. Carothers (2002, p. 10) 
wrote: 
Countries whose political life is marked by feckless pluralism tend to have 
significant amounts of political freedom, regular elections, and alternation 
of power between genuinely different political groupings. Despite these 
positive features, however, democracy remains shallow and troubled. 
Political participation, though broad at election time, extends little beyond 
voting. Political elites from all the major parties or groupings are widely 
perceived as corrupt, self-interested, and ineffective. The alternation of 
power seems only to trade the country’s problems back and forth from one 
hapless side to the other. Political elites from all the major parties are widely 
perceived as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest, and not serious about 
working for their country. The public is seriously disaffected from politics, 
and while it may still cling to a belief in the ideal of democracy, it is 
extremely unhappy about the political life of the country. Overall, politics is 
widely seen as a stale, corrupt, elite-dominated domain that delivers little 
good to the country and commands equally little respect. 
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And the state remains persistently weak. Economic policy is often poorly 
conceived and executed, and economic performance is frequently bad or 
even calamitous. Social and political reforms are similarly tenuous, and 
successive governments are unable to make headway on most of the major 
problems facing the country, from crime and corruption to health, education, 
and public welfare generally. 
Based on the abovementioned arguments, we can conclude that political 
power in Kyrgyzstan is fragmented and divided between many competing 
patronage networks, which, in the first place, pursue own mercantilistic interest 
and view state as a source for self-enrichment (Engvall, 2011). 
4.2.2 Corruption and Illegal Activities in the Power Sector 
 
In recent years, corruption in the power sector was one of the most 
frequently discussed issues in Kyrgyzstan, which ranked 154
th
 least corrupt 
country from the total of 174 positions in the Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index of 2012. Experts argue that the power sector is a 
fertile field for vast unlawful rent-seeking activities by employees of power 
companies and staff of related government agencies (Anti-corruption Business 
Council; Fuel Energy Sector Transparency Initiative; Non-government Ecological 
Foundation "Unison", 2012).  
Corruption in the power sector has serious negative implications for 
performance of the power sector enterprises, financial interests of the 
Government, overall economic growth, and is one of the main causes that brought 
about the stagnation of the industry (Anti-corruption Business Council; Fuel 
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Energy Sector Transparency Initiative; Non-government Ecological Foundation 
"Unison", 2012). Hasanov et al. (2011) and Izmailov et al. (2007) argue that 
corruption in the power sector negatively affects three parties: bona fide 
customers, who duly pay for electricity, but cannot enjoy satisfactory quality of 
service; companies of the power sector, which cannot provide quality services 
because of their inability to collect payments in full; state budget, which does not 
receive foregone dividends and taxes. Engvall (2011) argues that power industry 
is one of the few sectors of the Kyrgyz economy with the largest potential for 
rent-seeking activities. And exactly because of the scarcity of such lucrative 
resources competition for controlling rents in the sector and corruption are more 
destructive than in some resource-rich neighboring countries (Engvall, 2011).  
Rent-seeking and corruption in the power sector especially blossomed 
during Bakiev’s rule, whose family, besides the power sector, established control 
over all major sources of illegal rents and lucrative unlawful activities in the 
country, which are gold mining, banking industry, government institutions, 
providing access to loans and grants allocated by international financial 
organizations and donors, etc. 
Mr. Bakiev’s family under his presidency reaped substantial profits from 
closely controlling the power sector. However, it is believed that illegal activities 
are maintained even after the revolution, although at a smaller scale, taking into 
account the declared priority of eradicating corruption and increasing transparency 
in the sector. Some experts estimate that annually about 100 million USD (1.6 per 
cent of GDP in 2011) still leak away from the sector due to corruption and 
inefficiency (Anti-corruption Business Council; Fuel Energy Sector Transparency 
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Initiative; Non-government Ecological Foundation "Unison", 2012). Others 
announce a little less impressive, but still significant 30 million USD (Engvall, 
2011). Therefore, it is not surprising to see different political factions compete for 
the right to control such a lucrative sector of the economy. The fact that since 
April 2010 four ministers (one of them was appointed to the post twice), 
representing different political parties, already have been appointed to head the 
MEIKR can manifest to the fierce competition for this senior position. One of 
those four ministers had to resign voluntarily in the middle of the scandalous court 
trial on charges of importing radioactive coal.  
It has already been mentioned that some authors argue that it is a common 
practice to sell and buy posts in Kyrgyzstan. Engvall (2011) suggests that such 
post-trading has a pyramid structure, in which the rights to sell subordinate 
positions are delegated down the ladder. It is argued that this practice is spread to 
SOEs providing lucrative rent-seeking opportunities in such sectors as electric 
utilities, mining, telecommunications, etc. (Engvall, 2011). 
Hasanov et al. (2011) claim that political leaders use their power to 
appoint “own” people to top management positions in the SOEs not hoping to get 
immediate financial returns, but rather to strengthen own political standing and to 
get the opportunity to provide employment to other closely affiliated people. Thus 
newly appointed top managers start their tenure with objectives that diverge from 
those of the company.   
Rent-seeking Activities Peculiar to the Power Sector 
Report on the energy system corruption issue, jointly prepared by several 
NGOs, lists the following as the most frequently encountered kinds of legal 
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offences, which were described by other experts as well (Anti-corruption Business 
Council; Fuel Energy Sector Transparency Initiative; Non-government Ecological 
Foundation "Unison", 2012; Hasanov, et al., 2011):  
- procurement of goods and services at overestimated prices, including 
payments for services, which were not actually provided; 
- illicit manipulations of customers database and billing related data (for 
example, decreasing readings of electricity meters as a result of collusion between 
customers and controllers, creating accounts to the name of non-existing 
consumers, etc.); 
- chartering equipment at groundlessly low charges; 
- blackmailing customers for fabricated breaches of the service contract 
terms; 
- writing off accounts receivable and accounts payable without 
supporting documents, etc.   
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
5.1 Analysis of Rent-seeking Organization in Kyrgyzstan  
 
Analysis based on the description of main characteristics of political power 
distribution, distinguished by Engvall (2011) and Djuraev (2012) earlier in the 
text, allows drawing the following main conclusions about unique political 
structure of Kyrgyzstan. 
Political power distribution contest in Kyrgyzstan involves many 
fragmented political clan-based factions led by wealthy politicians and oligarchs. 
They compete for acquiring dominant positions on the political scene, which 
would allow them to use the state as a source for extracting rents for themselves 
and members of their clans. In this setting, money is used to buy political 
influence, which in turn is used as a mechanism for reaping rents from the state 
and protecting own property rights.   
Political situation can be balanced by providing all major factions with 
some access to public resources. Understandably, in any case the biggest winners 
of the distribution contest in current parliament-dominated structure are factions, 
belonging to the ruling coalition. However, it can be seen that even opposition 
parties, not belonging to the ruling group of factions, can still have a small share 
of the pie. It can be allocated to them in the form of government posts or 
opportunities to win rents, as a tradeoff for their agreement to maintain political 
stability.  
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When discussing rent-seeking in Kyrgyzstan, the first thing to note might 
be that it is difficult to find examples of any types of rents other than politically 
organized transfer rents. According to Khan (2000) in many developing countries 
redistribution of income is needed for maintaining political stability. After the 
events of April 2010 Kyrgyzstan can serve as the best illustration for correctness 
of this statement. From our theoretical discussion we know that transfer rents can 
only be effective, if they result in “primitive accumulation”, leading to creation of 
capitalist class and not in theft and wastage. It is not the case in the real world 
Kyrgyzstan, where we see that oligarchs and wealthy politicians struggle to seize 
power simply to create rents for themselves and their supporters, who represent 
mostly middle and upper-middle class, allowing only insignificant share to be 
sacrificed in transfers to the poor for maintaining political stability, which is 
needed to continue the self-enrichment process.       
Rents are extracted mainly through controlling the allocation of public 
budgets, exercising power to influence distribution of lucrative posts in the 
government, public service institutions, local governments and state-owned 
enterprises in certain profitable sectors with the highest rent-extracting potential.  
5.2 Major Stakeholders and Rents 
 
Discussion of rent-seeking activities in the power sector and their effect on the 
performance of electric power companies requires defining major stakeholders of 
the power sector, who enjoy different types of rents, and the way those parties 
interact with each other in the political economy context of the Kyrgyz power 
sector. The analytical method used in this section draws on the method used by 
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Suzuki (2001) for analyzing the effect that Indian political structure had on 
allocation of resources and rent-seeking activities in the unique political economy 
of the Indian power sector.  
Politicians 
As we saw in the previous section in Kyrgyzstan political power and 
business are closely interlinked. Business (material wealth) allows gaining 
political influence, which in turn provides protection and connections necessary 
for doing business successfully. Political power gives politicians rights to 
influence distribution of lucrative posts in the government, public service and 
state-owned enterprises, hence possibly creating a channel for extracting rents. 
In exchange for providing one set of clients with access to top level 
managerial positions in the power sector SOEs, politicians (patrons) can extract 
rents possibly in the form of capacity to provide employment in the SOEs to other 
constituencies (another set of clients), possibly in the form of bribes from both 
sets of clients and also ability to force SOEs to follow policies, which would be in 
line with patrons’ political objectives. 
Allocating managerial positions in the power sector SOEs in this fashion 
results in the low quality of management, because decisions to fill high-level 
managerial positions are made either through bribing mechanism or based on 
candidates’ allegiance to certain clan-based patron-client networks. Low quality 
of management is finally reflected in lower operational and financial performance 
of the power sector enterprises.  
Those professionals in the power sector, who pay bribes to their patrons, 
consider those bribes as investments and act accordingly to maximize return on 
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investment. Rents, enjoyed by the power sector professionals, and implications 
they have for efficiency of the power sector companies are discussed below.   
Consumers  
Politicians can use political power to organize transfers to voters in order 
to maintain political stability and to maintain or strengthen own organizational 
power, which can be critical for winning distributive contests (Khan, 2000). Also 
politicians in Kyrgyzstan can use resources, possibly accumulated as a result of 
previous rounds of rent-seeking activities, for buying political influence by 
bribing voters.  
In the power sector such redistributive rents are provided in the form of 
low electricity tariffs for residential users, which are subsidized by higher tariffs 
for other categories of consumers, electricity export revenues, and soft loans, 
issued to the power sector SOEs by the Ministry of Finance of KR. Tariffs for 
residential users are set far below full cost recovery level and therefore can be 
considered one of the reasons of poor financial performance of the power sector 
SOEs. These redistributive transfer rents are provided at the expense of the 
companies and state treasury and could be reflected in foregone profits, dividends 
and taxes. 
Notably, almost all voters are at the same time consumers of electric 
energy, since 98 per cent of population has access to electricity services. 
Industry Professionals 
In the pyramid structure of informal patron-client networks the top level 
industry professionals’ rent-seeking inputs come in the form of bribes to their 
patron politicians to ensure employment. Rents they seek ostensibly come in the 
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form of kickbacks on procurement and equipment chartering contracts, as well as 
bribes from own clients (lower level employees) down the informal patron-client 
pyramid.  
Lower level employees are involved in illicit activities, related to falsifying 
customers’ billing details, the most frequent one being collusion with customers to 
decrease reported readings of electric meters. In these cases both colluding parties 
accrue rents at the expense of the PDCs. As stated in the report by Tetra Tech Es. 
Figure 14: Rents in the Power Sector and Implications for Efficiency 
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Inc. (2011) PDCs employees are likely to falsify billing data to hide the amount of 
energy lost due to collusion with consumers by either inflating technical or 
commercial losses, or increasing accounts receivable, which are allegedly to be 
paid by the least reliable customers. 
Rent-seeking activities of power sector professionals result in high 
commercial and technical losses, which directly affect performance of the PDCs.  
Suppliers of Fuel and Equipment 
Corrupt professionals of the power sector enterprises collude with a limited 
number (oligopolistic market) of suppliers of fuel and equipment in order to 
conduct unfair tenders and auctions for procuring fuel and equipment. It can be 
argued that for the suppliers to have sufficient incentives to engage in such 
unlawful activities higher than normal rate of return might be needed. Also by 
regularly cooperating with the power sector professionals, suppliers can enjoy the 
advantage of operating in what effectively is either a monopolistic or oligopolistic 
environment with decreased competition or elimination of it altogether. The 
downside of such setting for the power sector is in the suppliers’ lack of 
incentives to provide high quality of fuel and equipment supplied. Already 
mentioned is the example with supplying radioactive coal for use in the Bishkek 
TPP. 
Outcomes of the rent-seeking activities by the power sector professionals 
and suppliers of fuel and equipment are inflated capital costs and poor quality of 
fuel and equipment, which adversely affect productivity and financial 
performance of the power sector.   
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5.3 Implications of Rent-Seeking for Social Welfare 
5.3.1 Inefficient Rents for Politicians and Power Industry Professionals 
 
It can be argued that significant share of rents, created and maintained by the 
stakeholders of the power sector are “inefficient” rents, representing resources 
withdrawn from production function altogether, thus possibly causing damages to 
overall social welfare. The reason is that, as was mentioned by Engvall (2011), in 
Kyrgyzstan with its low ‘rule of law’ the most effective means of protecting own 
property rights is political power, which means following loss of the political 
power individuals also lose the ability to protect own property rights. Taking into 
account that in developing countries significant wealth in many cases is built by 
means of illegal mechanisms, it is not surprising that such individuals are 
concerned about the possibility of their property rights being raided by the next 
wave of power-holders. With many politically active patron-client networks 
currently participating in the political power distribution contest in Kyrgyzstan the 
overall political situation cannot be defined as stable.  
These might be the reasons, why in developing countries many politicians 
or political entrepreneurs are likely to avoid investing in long-term assets, 
preferring keeping money in foreign banks or investing into higher liquidity 
assets. Family members of the former Presidents Akaev and Bakiev, living a 
luxury life abroad ostensibly spending money deposited in Swiss banks or the 
former Minister of Energy, Mr. Balkibekov, who allegedly bought an island in the 
UK giving him the guarantee of becoming ineligible for extradition to 
Kyrgyzstan, can be used as examples of such probably typical behavior for 
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corrupt rent-seekers from developing countries. Such people prefer keeping funds 
in places not easily accessible to Kyrgyzstani legal bodies, which may turn hostile 
in case of sudden adversity. 
As was stated by Khan (1996): “In a situation of instability no group is 
likely to have a long term view and rights, which maximize long-run profits, are 
not likely to be created. Instead the rights, which are likely to be created and 
reallocated, are rights which generate rents over short time horizons.” 
Based on the earlier discussion of the political context of Kyrgyzstan, it 
becomes evident that patron-client networks belong to the clientelist type (Khan, 
1996). Following Khan’s (1996) logic, rent-seeking activities, leading to leakage 
of funds from the productive use into these networks, are harmful for growth due 
to the rent-seekers’ unwillingness to put them back into productive use via 
commitment to long-term investments.  
5.3.2 Rents for Households 
 
When it comes to the redistributive rents provided to households in the 
form of low tariffs, there is also a set of problems, making it difficult to support a 
positive opinion on the effectiveness of these rents’ in provision of allocative 
efficiency in the power sector. It was already pointed out that the tariffs policy is 
flawed, since it provides all households, including affluent ones, with low tariffs 
subsidized by the other categories of users, electric energy export revenues, etc. 
Ironically, it was demonstrated that the more affluent people are those, who gain 
from these cross-subsidies the most at the expense of other categories of users as 
well as power sector companies and the state budget. Thus, we can see that 
102 
 
objectives of allocative efficiency cannot be met under such policies. Another 
important aspect, hindering the efficiency of these transfer rents, is that low 
straight-line tariffs do not provide incentives for more efficient use of electricity. 
Frugal and efficient use of electricity can make substantial power resources 
available in much shorter time and will require much less spending as compared 
to investments needed for increasing the capacity of generation (Hasanov, et al., 
2011). Taking this into account, such consumption-efficiency enhancing effect of 
introducing ‘block’ or ‘lifeline’ tariffs would be very welcome. 
Based on the arguments above and following the logic of the analytical 
framework described in the Literature Review chapter, we can conclude that all 
major rents and rent-seeking activities in the power sector, illustrated on Figure 
14, benefit almost exclusively the rent-seekers alone and result in the creation and 
maintenance of inefficient rents. These rents are created as a result of withdrawing 
resources from the productive use at expense of SOEs and public financial 
interests.  
When it comes to analyzing rents, resulting from low tariffs for the poorest 
citizens, it is unlikely that these rents will have significant impact on their quality 
of life for several reasons. First, as was mentioned earlier, poor households 
consume less electric power than more affluent consumers, which decreases share 
of subsidies received by the poor. Second, since current spending on energy in 
Kyrgyzstan according to Slay (2011) is below the affordability level even for the 
poorest, higher tariffs would probably not cause significant worsening of their 
quality of life, not even mentioning more affluent people.      
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5.4 General Implications of the PDCs’ Privatization  
 
From review of the privatization literature we saw that SOEs’ susceptibility to 
political influence was defined as one of the main factors causing inefficiency of 
the SOEs. The reason is that SOEs’ are forced by politicians, who tend to 
prioritize own political interests and maximization of personal wealth more than 
increasing social welfare, to pursue strategies maximizing payoffs to politicians 
and not the best interests of these firms (Boycko, Shleifer, & Wishny, 1996). 
Privatization in Kyrgyzstan is expected to contribute to the improvement 
of the power sector performance by significantly reducing politicians’ ability to 
influence decision making and employment aspects of the PDCs’ operations. 
Positive effect of privatization is achieved primarily through behavioral changes 
caused by shifts in incentives (Yarrow, 1986).  
As was mentioned earlier, soft-budget constraints and lenient monitoring 
requirements lead to distortion of SOE managers’ incentives. Therefore, 
hardening of budget constraints and replacing lenient formal monitoring 
requirements with effective performance monitoring system, following the 
privatization, are expected to allow new owners to effectively control managers, 
contribute to the development of effective corporate governance and rectify the 
distorted incentive problems. Introduction of more effective corporate governance 
practices and creation of incentives to improve cost-efficiency should result in 
improved performance of the PDCs. 
Divestiture of PDCs to strategic foreign investors was found by 
researchers to be leading to much better post-privatization performance as 
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compared to domestic owners. Privatization to foreign investors with proven 
record of successfully running electric utility companies is expected to attract 
capital and know-how necessary for modernizing electricity infrastructure, 
reducing system losses, and finally resulting in higher efficiency and better 
financial performance. 
Privatization of public utilities in most cases is accompanied by tariff 
raises, which, understandably, induce negative reaction by consumers, faced with 
the burden of increased costs. However, in Kyrgyzstan it would be erroneous to 
measure overall social welfare of electric utility services by the price aspect alone. 
Another factor worth consideration is the aspect of quality and reliability of 
electricity supply, which has been gradually deteriorating due to inadequate 
financing of maintenance and renewal of technical infrastructure. Poor technical 
condition of the electricity distribution networks is the reason of a large number of 
interruptions in services of electric power supply. Slay (2001) argues that the 
poorest people in Kyrgyzstan suffer from the interruptions of electricity supply the 
most. Also, taking into account that in Kyrgyzstan share of spending on energy in 
the overall spending is low by international standards even for the poor, it seems 
doubtful that moderate increase in the residential tariffs would result in the poor 
households facing significant loss of welfare.  
Moreover, taking into account the flawed tariffs policy in force, which 
allocates proportionally more subsidies to more affluent and politically active 
households, to achieve higher allocative efficiency it is probably necessary to 
revise tariffs before privatization takes place. Such revision could possibly be 
done by adopting block” or “lifeline” electricity tariffs structure, which would 
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provide for cross-subsidization of tariffs for the poor, who are expected to 
consume less energy, by other consumers, who use more electricity. According to 
Tallapragada et al. (2009) such tariffs, steeply increasing with the amount of 
electricity consumed, are more effective from the affordability perspective than 
straight-line tariffs. Very important side-effect of introducing such “block” tariffs 
would be creation of incentives for consumers to use electric power more 
efficiently.  
As was observed by various authors, privatizations of public utilities can 
have positive welfare effects and even make the lower income people the biggest 
beneficiaries of reforms (Wood, 2004; Guriev & Megginson, 2007).   
According to the consultancy company Tetra Tech Es Inc. (2011) 
increasing revenues of the power sector is absolutely necessary for creating 
conditions conducive to rehabilitation and development of the sector’s technical 
infrastructure, because continuation of current mode of operations will inevitably 
bring about gradual deterioration of the sector’s technical condition. Technical 
degradation will increasingly result in a daily hardship and high costs imposed on 
population and business community and create tangible risk of a catastrophic 
breakdown (TetraTech Es, Inc., 2011). 
5.5 Implications of Privatization for Rent-Seeking in the Power Sector 
 
Analysis of implications that privatization of the PDCs might have on major 
groups of the power sector stakeholders and rent-seeking activities, defined and 
discussed above, will be provided in this section. 
Politicians 
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Privatization of PDCs will be effective in reducing adverse effects that 
unproductive rent-seeking activities by politicians might have for efficiency of the 
power sector enterprises. This positive effect can be achieved mainly as a result of 
significant reduction of the politicians’ capacity to control strategies, followed by 
the power sector enterprises, including strategies, defining the PDCs’ human 
resource management policies.  
Private ownership by foreign investors is expected to result in drastic 
changes in the way personnel is selected, managed and promoted on the basis of 
merit and talent. Using competitive selection procedures for hiring managers, who 
will be likely to have advanced management knowledge and skills, should bring 
about significant improvement in the PDCs efficiency. 
Hardening of budget constraint and introduction of effective corporate 
governance mechanisms should help rectify incentives problems and orientate 
managers towards focusing on achieving higher cost-efficiency in the PDCs 
operations. Improved overall monitoring by foreign owners and introduction of 
effective internal audit function should greatly hinder managers’ ability to engage 
in collusive procurement and tendering procedures.    
Consumers  
As was mentioned above, it is likely that tariff raises might be needed to 
make privatization attractive for investors. Despite a generally cautious attitude 
that people in developing countries have to privatization, it can be noted that 
many researchers of outcomes that privatization reforms had in many developing 
countries suggest that even the poorest enjoyed welfare increases following 
privatization of public utilities. 
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It is probably very straightforward to suggest that raising tariffs will 
contribute to financial performance of the PDCs. Off course, in case of the natural 
monopolies like public utilities, even after the privatization the government should 
reserve the right to regulate operations of PDCs. If the objective of privatization is 
to reach self-sustainability of power sector enterprises, as is stated in diverse 
strategic policy documents of the government of KR, the tariffs policy should be 
set so as to provide foreign investors with an opportunity to maintain certain level 
of profitability.  
As was pointed out earlier, the PDCs’ ability to use disconnections of non-
paying customers as a disciplinary measure is seriously weakened by resistance to 
it by government entities, local municipalities, law enforcement agencies and 
other politically influential groups (TetraTech Es, Inc., 2011). Since privatization 
is expected to result in weakening control of PDCs by politicians, it should also 
decrease the influence by the abovementioned parties. Thus, privatization is 
expected to allow the PDCs to use disconnections more effectively as a 
disciplining tool, eventually leading to increased collection of payments and better 
financial performance.  
Industry Professionals 
As has already been mentioned above, the severe “agency” problem 
causing distortion of incentives can partially be resolved by withdrawal of soft 
budget constraint and introduction of effective corporate governance mechanisms. 
Exacting monitoring requirements imposed by foreign investors and duly 
conducted internal audit should prevent managers from getting involved in large-
scale violations of the specified procurement rules.  
108 
 
Elimination of corruption on lower levels will probably require more time, 
taking into account the large number of subdivisions that each PDC has. However, 
it is likely that new management will make efforts to decrease opportunities for 
such illicit data manipulations and electricity pilfering, possibly by introducing 
advanced billing input systems, changing hardware, used for metering electricity 
consumption, or creating internal security division, etc.  
Based on the projections above, we can conclude that divestiture of PDCs 
to large foreign investors is likely to bring about significant reduction in technical 
and commercial losses, increase collection of payments, which improve financial 
position of all power sector enterprises, including the upstream generation and 
transmission companies.  
Suppliers of Fuel and Equipment 
Privatization of PDCs
8
 is expected to practically resolve the issue of 
collusion between corrupt power sector professionals and oligopolistic group of 
fuel and equipment suppliers. As has already been mentioned, private owners are 
expected to improve overall monitoring and introduce effective internal audit 
function, which should significantly weaken the opportunities for collusive 
procurement and tendering procedures. By doing so, privatization effectively puts 
an end to previously constrained competition in the tendering processes. Increased 
competition should eliminate allocation of rents to the suppliers in the form of 
excessively high prices, which previously could be maintained due to collusive 
agreement with the power sector professionals. Increased competition should 
                                                          
8
 In the last several attempts to privatize JSC “Severelectro”, the biggest and best performing of all 
PDCs, it was bundled into privatization package together with Bishkek TPP, which is the main 
consumer of fuel oil, natural gas and coal. 
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restore incentives for providing high quality of fuel and equipment necessary to 
win tendering contests.  
Thus, we can see that privatization is expected to resolve the issue of 
inflated capital costs and restore incentives for providing high quality of fuel and 
equipment. This will positively affect both financial and operational performance 
of PDCs. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
Power sector has always been a so-called “strategically” important sector of the 
Kyrgyz economy. However, for many years the necessity of financing the 
rehabilitation of the power sector’s fixed assets was neglected, which led to 
gradual deterioration of technical infrastructure of the power sector. High level of 
technical wear and tear coupled with unsatisfactory financial performance is the 
reason, causing inability of the power sector companies to provide satisfactory 
level of quality and reliability of power supply. 
This research was conducted in order to achieve deep understanding of main 
factors, causing the inefficiency of the power sector enterprises. In this thesis 
special focus was placed on defining the types of rent-seeking activities and rents, 
enjoyed by the main groups of the power sector stakeholders, and analyzing how 
these rent-seeking activities might influence performance of the power 
distribution companies.  
Another question, this thesis sought to answer, was to define reasons why 
privatization of the power distribution companies, which for a long time was 
presented as a possible remedy for addressing the sector’s efficiency problems, is 
likely to cause contraction of corruption and other inefficient rent-seeking 
activities in the power sector, leading to improvement in efficiency.  
The inefficiency in the distribution of electric energy is, in the first place, 
reflected in high technical and commercial losses of electric energy, as well as in 
poor collection of tariff payments, leading to accumulation of huge accounts 
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receivable and accounts payable that the power distribution companies have to 
reimburse to the generation and transmission companies. These are the indications 
of the importance that efficiency of the PDCs in decreasing system losses and 
collecting payments for supplied electricity has for sustaining stable financial 
condition of the sector’s SOEs. At the same time, it was suggested by many 
experts that corruption and other deeply embedded rent-seeking activities in the 
sector lead to aggravation of the inefficiency problem. 
Privatization of power sector enterprises in Kyrgyzstan has controversial 
history, to say the least. As was mentioned earlier, privatization of two power 
distribution companies was conducted in a dubious manner resulting in 
transferring control over these PDCs to a company, which was allegedly affiliated 
with the family of the former President Bakiev. Soon after the revolution of April 
2010 the interim Government nationalized these companies back. Taking into 
account this controversial privatization experience in, it certainly will be difficult 
for the Government to go for privatization of the PDCs in the short term. Yet 
privatization of the power distribution companies is possible in principle, and can 
still be considered as a possibly effective means of improving efficiency of power 
sector companies. 
Market for political power in Kyrgyzstan is fragmented and many clan-
based patron-client networks compete for gaining dominant position. Business 
and politics are closely interconnected in Kyrgyzstan. Substantial financial 
resources, held by businesspeople, can be used for purchasing political power, 
which in turn can be used as a means of securing protection for property rights 
and creating opportunities for the business to grow. In this system political and 
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business players view the state as a vehicle for self-enrichment and source of rents 
for themselves and their supporters. Due to salability of many posts in the 
government, civil service, municipal bodies, lucrative SOEs people consider those 
positions as risky assets, which they invested into with the goal of maximizing 
return on investments in the shortest time possible.  
 
Research Question 1: How do corruption and other rent-seeking activities in the 
power sector affect efficiency and profitability of power sector enterprises? 
This research question was tackled by applying the rent-seeking theory 
based analytical framework, discussed earlier in the text to the assessment of 
implications that rent-seeking activities, described above, might have for 
efficiency of the power distribution companies. This analysis required deep 
understanding of complex political context of Kyrgyzstan, including aspects, 
affecting the distribution of political power, such as informal competition between 
many fragmented informal patron-client networks.  
Analysis of rent-seeking activities and corruption in the power sector 
helped define four major groups of the power sector stakeholders, who enjoy rents 
from the power sector. These are politicians, consumers, power sector 
professionals and suppliers of fuel and equipment. All of these actors enjoy 
certain types of rents at the expense of the power sector SOEs and the state budget. 
Politicians enjoy patronage payments and acquire ability to force SOEs to follow 
strategies, maximizing paybacks for the politicians. Power sector professionals 
extract rents through bribes from consumers for making illegal manipulations to 
billing records in order to decrease the amounts to be paid, engage in collusive 
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transactions with suppliers of fuel and equipment, etc. Residential consumers 
receive rents in the form of low tariffs, which are set far below marginal cost level 
and therefore have to be subsidized by other categories of users. The problem 
related to the residential tariffs is that the effective tariff structure allocates large 
share of subsidies to more affluent households, who do not need support by the 
state. Also low straight-line tariffs fail to create incentives for more efficient use 
of electricity by households. Suppliers of fuel and equipment enjoy rents in the 
form of excessively high profit margins and functioning in the environment with 
constrained competition. 
Analysis of rent-seeking activities of all four groups of stakeholders reveal 
that all four have negative implications for operational and financial efficiency of 
PDCs, as illustrated on Figure 14.  
Analysis of rents suggests that significant share of rents, created and 
maintained by the power sector stakeholders are “inefficient” rents, representing 
resources withdrawn from production function altogether, thus possibly causing 
damage to overall social welfare. 
       
Research Question 2: Why privatization of power distribution companies is likely 
to bring about improvement in efficiency and growth?   
Second research question was tackled by applying conclusions, drawn 
from the theoretical and empirical literature on privatization; to the analysis of the 
effect that privatization might have on rent-seeking activities in the power sector.  
Privatization of PDCs is likely to have positive effect leading to reduction 
of adverse effects that politicians’ rent-seeking activities might have for efficiency 
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of the power sector enterprises. This is achieved mostly due to improvement in 
corporate management practices, and rectifying the managerial incentives 
problem. Privatization is also expected to result in hardening of budget constraint 
and introduction of effective corporate governance and exacting monitoring 
mechanisms, which are expected to create efficiency-enhancing incentives and 
lead to serious contraction of corrupt activities by the power sector employees. 
Revision of tariffs, which usually precedes or accompanies privatization, also 
should contribute to improving financial performance of the PDCs.  
Based on the projections above, we can conclude that divestiture of PDCs 
to foreign investors is likely to bring about significant reduction in technical and 
commercial losses, increase collection of payments and decrease capital costs. All 
these changes are expected to have positive effect on operational and financial 
efficiency of the power distribution companies.   
 
What is needed for successful privatization? 
As was indicated by many researchers ( (Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda, & 
Svejnar, 2009; Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1997; Yarrow, A Theory of Privatization, or 
Why Bureaucrats are Still in Business, 1999) it is very important to recognize that 
privatization alone cannot guarantee improvement in the efficiency. To reach its 
efficiency enhancement objectives it needs to be accompanied by an array of 
systemic changes and complementary reforms. As can be seen from many real life 
examples, in many cases SOEs’ inefficiency problems and possible solutions were 
revealed long ago, but decisive action can be halted for long due to priority 
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objectives that had to be tackled by the incumbent governments at that time 
(Bacon & Besant-Jones, 2001).  
It needs to be noted that consumers in many developing countries tend to 
view privatization as detrimental to the welfare of the poor and benefitting only 
the powerful and wealthy (Auriol & Blanc, 2009). Because there are always 
people, who will suffer from reforms, success of privatization requires provision 
of sufficient benefits to these people in order to persuade them to accept 
privatization (Bacon & Besant-Jones, 2001). 
 
In Kyrgyzstan, which like many other developing countries, is faced with 
problems of dismal inefficiency in the public sector, privatization seems to offer 
very promising outlooks. However, when planning for implementation of 
privatization reforms following the guidelines provided above can prove crucial 
for avoiding pitfalls and ensuring overall success of reforms.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: The Structure of Power Sector Governance in the Kyrgyz Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Abdyrasulova, N., & Kravsov, N. (2009, October). Electricity Governance in 
Kyrgyzstan: An Institutional Assessment 
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Appendix 2: Distribution of Social Benefits in Kyrgyzstan, by Household Deciles 
(2006-2010) 
 
Source: Energy and Communal Services in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: A Poverty and Social Impact 
Assessment, Slay B. 2011 
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Appendix 3 
 
Source: the MEIKR data, provided in the electronic spreadsheet format 
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POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES' ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AND ACCOUNTS PAYABLE (2009-2011)
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
Accounts Receivable thous.som 1,060,504 220,576 288,270 414,508 278,023 291,510 766,349 490,343 625,227 137,614 190,590 289,992 2,378,975 1,179,532 1,494,999
Industrial thous.som 36,685 22,401 290,659 80,268 98,498 119,623 67,136 78,954 75,186 20,666 11,626 14,788 204,755 211,479 500,256
as % of total 3.5% 10.2% 100.8% 19.4% 35.4% 41.0% 8.8% 16.1% 12.0% 15.0% 6.1% 5.1% 8.6% 17.9% 33.5%
Government Institutions thous.som 32,011 30,935 31,559 21,137 21,451 26,240 19,335 33,780 13,526 11,191 13,627 35,539 83,675 99,793 106,863
as % of total 3.0% 14.0% 10.9% 5.1% 7.7% 9.0% 2.5% 6.9% 2.2% 8.1% 7.1% 12.3% 3.5% 8.5% 7.1%
Agricultural thous.som 77,150 6,032 -4,307 2,724 1,479 2,912 17,057 7,374 12,100 937 2,790 -293 97,868 17,675 10,411
as % of total 7.3% 2.7% -1.5% 0.7% 0.5% 1.0% 2.2% 1.5% 1.9% 0.7% 1.5% -0.1% 4.1% 1.5% 0.7%
Households thous.som 757,644 108,917 197,281 288,238 128,453 86,898 543,251 306,360 416,064 94,568 145,888 214,027 1,683,701 689,618 914,271
as % of total 71.4% 49.4% 68.4% 69.5% 46.2% 29.8% 70.9% 62.5% 66.5% 68.7% 76.5% 73.8% 70.8% 58.5% 61.2%
Other consumers thous.som 157,013 52,291 -226,923 22,140 28,143 55,837 119,570 63,875 108,352 10,252 16,660 25,931 308,976 160,967 -36,802
as % of total 14.8% 23.7% -78.7% 5.3% 10.1% 19.2% 15.6% 13.0% 17.3% 7.4% 8.7% 8.9% 13.0% 13.6% -2.5%
Writing off approved by 
the law 16 of 
01.28.2010 
thous.som 930,415 254,346 484,325 90,779 1,759,865
Accounts Payable
To generation 
company
thous.som 2,120,671 1,041,709 1,057,992 421,514 306,279 328,232 1,148,406 165,354 167,723 9,182 20,418 25,709 3,699,773 1,533,760 1,579,656
Writing off approved by 
the law 16 of 
01.28.2010 
1,171,474 218,709 660,269 3,104 2,053,558
To transmission 
company
thous.som 561,223 436,798 445,341 120,846 124,979 147,278 717,675 374,553 385,306 233,995 256,491 299,283 1,633,738 1,192,822 1,277,207
Writing off approved by 
the law 16 of 
01.28.2010 
thous.som 153,228 33,688 199,810 64,574 451,300
PDCs totalVostokelectroSeverelectro Oshelectro Djalalabatelectro
Appendix 4 
Source: the MEIKR data, provided in the electronic spreadsheet format 
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Appendix 5 
 
 
 
2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011
TOTAL PAYMENTS 
COLLECTED
thous.som 3,316,847 3,660,853 798,915 893,168 1,048,866 1,250,095 708,229 860,096 5,872,857 6,664,212
From Households thous.som 1,526,678 1,683,258 354,099 411,310 553,579 649,973 270,239 358,450 2,704,595 3,102,991
% of total 46.0% 46.0% 44.3% 46.1% 52.8% 52.0% 38.2% 41.7% 46.1% 46.6%
OVERALL 
COLLECTION,               
as % of sales
% 94.5% 98.0% 88.8% 86.5% 86.3% 90.8% 83.5% 90.1% 90.7% 93.6%
Industrial % 58.8% 58.0% 98.7% 92.0% 105.3% 100.3% 100.9% 97.4%
Government Institutions % 105.1% 97.0% 98.1% 102.3% 112.1% 112.9% 95.7% 85.7%
Agricultural % 106.4% 114.0% 46.2% 16.6% 57.8% 70.5% 218.6% 159.3%
Households % 89.4% 95.0% 82.7% 91.9% 81.1% 85.7% 67.7% 86.1% 84.0% 91.3%
Other consumers % 129.8% 136.0% 85.1% 83.4% 65.3% 80.0% 84.6% 90.9%
Expected Increase in in 
Accounts Receivable (Sales 
less Collection)
thous.som 192,710 93,302 100,878 138,987 166,230 126,098 139,918 94,224 599,736 452,611
Djalalabatelectro PDCs Total
POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES - COLLECTION OF 
PAYMENTS (2010 - 2011)
Severelectro Vostokelectro Oshelectro
Source: the MEIKR data, provided in the electronic spreadsheet format 
